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I. Introduction
In Wyoming, conservation easements have become a significant tool for
land conservation. Conservation easements are a form of private land restriction
voluntarily imposed on property by landowners to preserve agricultural and ranch
land, wildlife habitat, and scenic resources. If conservation easements comply
with federal tax law requirements, their contribution generates significant federal
income and estate tax savings.1
In 2010, conservation easements protected over 46,000 acres of Wyoming
land.2 That same year land trusts spent over $20 million purchasing conservation
easements in Wyoming.3 The potential development value extinguished by these
conservation easements is easily in the hundreds of millions of dollars.
Funding for the purchase of conservation easements in Wyoming comes
from a number of sources including the Farm and Ranch Protection Program of
the Natural Resources Conservation Service of the United States Department of
Agriculture, the Wyoming Wildlife Natural Resources Trust Fund, the Wyoming
Department of Game and Fish, the Jonah Interagency Office, the Rocky Mountain
Elk Foundation, and private contributions. These sales are almost always
“bargain sales.” 4
1
See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h) (2006) (defining qualified conservation contributions); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.170A-14 (2011) (giving further regulatory definition to qualified conservation contributions).
2

E-mail from various individuals to author (Jan. 2011) (on file with author).

3

Id.

See 26 U.S.C. §§ 170, 1011(b) (defining allowable charitable contributions for federal
tax purposes and bargain sales as related to charitable contributions). Bargain sales are those in
which the seller and buyer agree to a price that is less than the appraised value of the conservation
easement. See id. § 1011(b). The difference is intended and recognized as a charitable contribution.
4
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There have been a number of recent developments affecting the tax law
governing conservation easements in Wyoming and throughout the United States.5
This article addresses two of those changes. First, this article discusses changes
to federal income tax law affecting conservation easements. Second, this article
covers judicial decisions concerning a number of tax law preconditions to the
deductibility of conservation easements, including substantiation, subordination,
valuation, and denial of deductions for sham transactions.

II. Tax Law Changes
Congress recently enacted the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010 (2010 Tax Act).6 This law reinstates
significant income tax provisions affecting conservation easements that expired
at the end of 2009.7 Congress made the tax benefits of conservation easements
available to landowners with modest incomes by increasing the percentage of
income against which a deduction for the contribution of a conservation easement
may be claimed and by increasing the period over which that deduction may
be used.

A. Faster Write-Off of Conservation Easement Deductions
Suppose Rancher Will contributes a conservation easement over his 1000acre ranch outside of Cody. The ranch has excellent views of the Absarokas,
incredible trout streams, and many spectacular home sites. The conservation
easement preserves Will’s ability (and that of his successors in title) to ranch,
hunt, fish, and engage in other traditional recreational activities. The easement
also reserves rights to divide the ranch into three parcels, each of which can be
separately conveyed, and each of which can contain one residential compound.
Assume that before the easement was in place, the ranch was worth $25 million
and that after the easement was in place, the ranch was worth $10 million. The

See id. §§ 170, 1011(b). Due to the requirements of most sources of funding for the purchase of
conservation easements, purchase prices are typically less than 50% of the appraised value of the
easement. A taxpayer who sells property for less than its fair market value (i.e., makes a “bargain
sale”) to a charitable organization is entitled to a charitable contribution deduction under § 170(a)
that is equal to the difference between the fair market value of the property and the amount realized
from its sale. See id. § 170(a); Stark v. Comm’r, 86 T.C. 243, 255–56 (1986).
This article covers the principal changes occurring since the author’s publication of Income
Tax Aspects of Conservation Easements, 5 Wyo. L. Rev. 1 (2005).
5

Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, 124 Stat. 3296 (to be codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
6

7
Id. § 723 (delaying the expiration of tax provisions affecting conservation easements
contributed after December 31, 2009, namely 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(vi), (b)(2)(B)(iii) to
December 31, 2011).
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difference of $15 million is the value of the charitable contribution made by Will
in conveying the easement.
Now assume that Will’s ranching operations and other investments generate
$500,000 in adjusted gross income annually. Under the tax law that existed for
most of 2010, Rancher Will could claim, annually, a maximum of $150,000 of
the $15 million value of the easement contribution.8 Moreover, he would be able
to carry unused portions of that deduction forward for only five additional years.9
In other words, the most that Will’s contribution could save him in income tax
would be $315,000.10 Under this version of the tax law, $14.1 million of the value
of the easement contribution would be unusable.11
In order to fully utilize a $15 million charitable deduction, Will’s income
would need to be at least $50 million.12 Granted there are a few ranch owners
in Wyoming whose income probably exceeds $50 million over a six-year period
(or even over a one-year period); however, those high-earning ranch owners are
probably not earning that from the ranch itself. In other words, the income tax
laws in place for most of 2010 and most of the history of the charitable deduction
for conservation easement contributions favored those with large incomes and
not the average farmer or rancher.13

8

See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(C)(i), (b)(1)(G).

9

See id. § 170(b)(1)(C)(ii).

$500,000 (Will’s adjusted gross income (AGI) annually) x 30% (the percentage of AGI
against which the easement deduction may be taken) x 35% (the maximum tax rate applicable) x
6 (the total number of years over which the deduction may be claimed) = $315,000. See id. § 170(b)
(1)(C)(i), (b)(1)(C)(ii), (b)(1)(G). Of course, if Will has other contributions, they may reduce the
amount allowable for the use of the conservation easement deduction. See id. § 170 (allowing the
deductibility of charitable contributions generally). Furthermore, not all of the income sheltered by
the easement deduction may be taxed at the top rate of 35%, which would lower the actual savings
realized. See id. §§ 1–15 (specifying a progressive system of tax rates).
10

11
See supra notes 8–10 and accompanying text. Under this version of the law, one technique
frequently used to avoid the loss of major portions of a conservation easement deduction was to phase
the contribution over a number of years. Using this technique, Will might contribute a conservation
easement over 250 acres at a time, placing each new 250-acre easement when the deduction from
the preceding contribution had been used. Whether the “economic substance doctrine” might apply
to this approach, resulting in a claim by the IRS that all phases should be “collapsed” into one
contribution, is a bit hard to predict. See 26 U.S.C.A § 7701(o) (West 2011) (defining how the
IRS tests the economic substance of a transaction). Nothing in the tax law requires an individual
to contribute more at one time than he chooses, and there are many good reasons, other than tax
savings, that a landowner may have for protecting only a portion of his land at a time. See infra notes
232–46 and accompanying text (discussing phasing).

$15,000,000/.3 = $50,000,000. See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(B)(i) (limiting, generally,
deductible contributions of individuals to 30% of their income).
12

Note that the 2010 Tax Act is retroactive to January 1, 2010, thereby superseding the law
formerly in place for 2010. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job
Creation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 723(c), 124 Stat. 3296, 3316.
13

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss2/6

4

Lindstrom: Recent Developments in the Law Affecting Conservation Easements:

2011

Conservation Easements

437

However, with the enactment of the 2010 Tax Act, the tax rules governing the
write-off of conservation easement contributions which had expired at the end of
2009 have been reinstated for 2010 and 2011.14 These rules allow all taxpayers
to claim deductions for the contribution of a conservation easement, up to 50%
of their adjusted gross income, and to carry unused portions of those deductions
forward for fifteen years.15
These rules would allow Rancher Will to realize a maximum of $1.4 million
in tax savings.16 This assumes that Will’s annual income for the sixteen-year
period in which he can use the deduction remains at $500,000. This tax savings
represents an additional $1.085 million in tax savings when compared to the prior
law. Nevertheless, $11 million of Will’s contribution has been lost.17

B. Special Rule for Farmers and Ranchers
Suppose $255,000 of Rancher Will’s annual income comes from his ranching
operations. If this is the case, Will qualifies as a “rancher” for purposes of writing
off his conservation easement deduction.18 If Will is a qualified rancher then he is

14
15

See id. § 723(a)–(c).
26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E). The Internal Revenue Code (Code) provides:
(i) In general. Any qualified conservation contribution (as defined in subsection
(h)(1)) shall be allowed to the extent the aggregate of such contributions does not
exceed the excess of 50 percent of the taxpayer’s contribution base over the amount of
all other charitable contributions allowable under this paragraph.
(ii) Carryover. If the aggregate amount of contributions described in clause (i) exceeds
the limitation of clause (i), such excess shall be treated (in a manner consistent with
the rules of subsection (d)(1)) as a charitable contribution to which clause (i) applies
in each of the 15 succeeding years in order of time.

Id.
16
$500,000 (Will’s adjusted gross income annually) x 50% (the percentage of AGI against
which the easement deduction may be taken) x 35% (the maximum tax rate applicable) x 16 (the
total number of years over which the deduction may be claimed) = $1,400,000. See id.
17
$15,000,000 (the value of the easement contribution) – ($500,000 x 50% x 16) =
$11,000,000. See id. (limiting the contribution deduction to 50% of gross income over sixteen years).
18
Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(v). The Code provides the following definition: “For purposes of
clause (iv), the term ‘qualified farmer or rancher’ means a taxpayer whose gross income from the
trade or business of farming (within the meaning of section 2032A(e)(5)) is greater than 50 percent
of the taxpayer’s gross income for the taxable year.” Id. The Code provides the following definition
for the term “farming purposes”:

(A) cultivating the soil or raising or harvesting any agricultural or horticultural
commodity (including the raising, shearing, feeding, caring for, training, and
management of animals) on a farm;
(B) handling, drying, packing, grading, or storing on a farm any agricultural or
horticultural commodity in its unmanufactured state, but only if the owner, tenant,
or operator of the farm regularly produces more than one-half of the commodity so
treated; and
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allowed to use his conservation easement contribution deduction against 100%
of his adjusted gross income.19 This increases his potential income tax savings to
$2.8 million.20 He still loses $7 million of his potential deduction.21 However, he
can consider phasing the contribution to attempt to utilize more of the potential deduction.22
There is one requirement to claim the 100% write-off in addition to the source
of income requirement: the contributed conservation easement must provide that
the land subject to the easement will “remain available” for agriculture or livestock
production.23 Note this requirement does not state that the land subject to the
easement must continue to be farmed or ranched, merely that it “remain available”
for such activity.24 The following example conservation easement provision is
intended to ensure compliance with the requirement that the land subject to the
easement “remain available” for agriculture or livestock production:
Example: In accordance with the provisions of §§ 170(b)(1)(E)
(iv)(II) and 170(b)(2)(B)(i)(II) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended, it is a requirement of this Easement that
the Property shall remain available for agricultural and livestock
production; however, this provision shall not be deemed to
require continued active agricultural or livestock production on
the Property.
An important feature of the 100% write-off is that the income requirement
only applies in the year of the contribution, not in later years.25 Therefore, a
landowner might earn over 50% of his income in the year of the contribution
from the “business of farming or ranching” and thereafter earn all of his income
from investments. The 100% write-off will continue to apply in future years, to

(C) (i) the planting, cultivating, caring for, or cutting of trees, or
(ii) the preparation (other than milling) of trees for market.
Id. § 2032A(e)(5).
19

See id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(v)(I).

$500,000 (Will’s adjusted gross income annually) x 100% (the percentage of AGI against
which the easement deduction may be taken) x 35% (the maximum tax rate applicable) x 16 (the total
number of years over which the deduction may be claimed) = $2,800,000. See id. § 170(b)(1)(E).
20

$15,000,000 (the value of the easement contribution) – ($500,000 x 100% x 16) =
$7,000,000. See id. (limiting the contribution deduction to the aggregate of gross income over
sixteen years).
21

22

See infra notes 232–46 and accompanying text (discussing phasing).

23

See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv)(II).

24

Id.

25

Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(iv)(I), (b)(1)(E)(v).
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the extent that the deduction was not fully used in the year of the contribution,
regardless of the donor’s source of income in those future years.
Unfortunately, proceeds from the sale of a conservation easement are not
considered “income from the trade or business of farming.” 26 This means if the
bargain sale of a conservation easement generates enough income from the sale
so that the rancher’s income from the business of farming or ranching falls below
50% of his total income, he is ineligible for the 100% write-off. 27 This is true
even though in future years his income may be entirely from the business of
farming or ranching.
In theory, a landowner who intends to bargain sell a conservation easement
could structure the sale so he only received a portion of the sale’s price in the year
in which the easement was conveyed, with the balance due in future years. So long
as the contributed portion of the bargain sale occurs in a year when the income
from the sale does not reduce the rancher’s income from the business of farming
or ranching to below 51% of total income, the 100% write-off will be available.28
Structuring the bargain sale of a conservation easement in this manner, however,
risks making the transaction a sham for tax purposes.29

C. C Corporations
C corporations are limited in their use of charitable deductions to 10% of
their “taxable” income.30 Because taxable income is a smaller number than adjusted
gross income and, of course, 10% is less than 30% or 50%, tax benefits to C
corporations for the contribution of conservation easements can be significantly
less advantageous than they are for individuals. However, under the 2010 Tax
Act the rules that prevailed in 2009 for C corporations making contributions
of conservation easements have been reinstated as well, provided that the
corporation’s stock is not “readily tradable on an established securities market at

26

See id. §§ 170(b)(1)(E)(v), 2032A(e)(5).

See infra notes 223–31 and accompanying text (discussing the use of the installment sales
provisions to avoid this result and the probable pitfalls of such an approach).
27

28
26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(v). The income requirement qualifies a farmer or rancher only if
the donor’s income from the business of farming is “greater than” 50% of his or her total income. Id.
29

See infra Part III.E (discussing sham transactions).

26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2)(A). C corporations are those in which corporate income is taxed at
corporate rates, as opposed to S corporations, in which corporate income is passed through to and
taxed at the shareholder level. Id. § 1361(a)–(b).
30
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any time” during the year of the contribution.31 These rules allow C corporations
earning more than 50% of their income from the “business of farming” to writeoff conservation easement deductions against 100% of their income and carry
unused portions of the deduction forward for fifteen years, just like individuals.32

D. Contributions of Fee Interests
The 2010 Tax Act’s enhanced write-off and carry-forward provisions for
conservation easement contribution deductions also extend to contributions (or
bargain sales) of real property in fee where the donor reserves a “qualified mineral
interest” in the property.33 A qualified mineral interest is the donor’s interest in
subsurface oil, gas, or other minerals and the right to access such minerals.34 In
other words, if a landowner contributes an outright interest in land and retains
a qualified mineral interest in that land, he is entitled to the enhanced write-off
provisions of the 2010 Tax Act. Ironically, if the landowner contributes his entire
interest in the fee without retaining any mineral interest, he does not qualify for
the enhanced benefits of the 2010 Tax Act. Instead, such a donor will be limited
to writing off the deduction against no more than 30% of his adjusted gross
income and carrying forward unused portions of the deduction for no more than
five years. In other words, the more limited gift receives the better tax treatment.
This seemingly backward result is because the original 2006 enhanced
write-off provisions applied to “qualified conservation contributions” only.35
The law defines “qualified conservation contributions” as the “contribution of
a—(i) qualified real property interest, (ii) to a qualified organization, (iii) exclusively
for conservation purposes.”36 For purposes of this definition, a “qualified real
property interest” includes both conservation easements and the “entire interest of
the donor other than a qualified mineral interest.”37 A remainder interest will also
qualify as a “qualified real property interest.”38 Thus, if a landowner is planning
to contribute an outright fee interest, he or she would be well advised to retain a
“qualified mineral interest” when making the contribution in order to be able to
claim the benefit of the 2010 Tax Act’s enhanced write-off provisions.

31

Id. § 170(b)(2)(B)(i).

32

Id. § 170(b)(2)(B).

33

Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i), (b)(1)(E)(iv), (h)(1).

34

Id. § 170(h)(6).

35

Id. § 170(b)(1)(E)(i).

36

Id. § 170(h)(1).

37

Id. § 170(h)(2).

38

Id. § 170(h)(2)(B).
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E. Enhanced Benefits for S Corporations
S corporations are “small business corporations” that elect to be S corporations
as provided for in 26 U.S.C. § 1362.39 Generally speaking, an S corporation’s
income is not taxed at the corporate level but is passed through to the shareholders
along with losses and deductions.40 However, deductions, including the deduction
for charitable contributions, may only pass through to shareholders to the extent
of their basis in their shares.41
For example, Ranch Corporation, an S corporation, has two shareholders
Sam and Enid. Sam’s basis in his 60% ownership of corporate shares is $60,000.
Enid’s basis in her ownership of the remaining 40% of the corporation is $40,000.
Ranch Corporation makes a contribution of a conservation easement valued at
$500,000. Under applicable tax law prior to the 2010 Tax Act, Ranch Corporation
could only pass $60,000 of that deduction through to Sam and $40,000 of that
deduction to Enid. Unless Sam and Enid were able to increase their basis in future
years (e.g., by making loans to the corporation or contributing capital assets) the
remainder of the deduction would be lost.42
The 2010 Tax Act reinstated the prior law allowing S corporations to pass
through conservation easement deductions without regard to the shareholders’
basis—to a certain extent.43 The restated rule provides,

39

Id. § 1361(a).

40

Id. § 1366(a)–(c).

41

Id. § 1366(d)(1).

Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Pub.
L. No. 111-312, § 752, 124 Stat. 3296, 3321 (amending the carryover basis for S corporations).
Note that unused deductions may be carried forward indefinitely by an S corporation. 26 U.S.C.
§ 1366(d)(2). However, charitable contributions are subject to the carry-forward limitations of
§ 170(b)(1). Therefore, to the extent a shareholder’s basis prevents him from utilizing his prorata share of a charitable contribution deduction passed through from an S corporation, he may
expect the unused balance of that deduction to be available in future years without limitation. Id.
§§ 170(b)(1), 1366(d)(2). However, once the deduction passes through to him as an individual, his
ability to carry-forward any portion of the deduction that he cannot use is subject to the limitation
of § 170(b)(1).
42

43
Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
§ 752, 124 Stat. at 3321 (amending the carryover basis for S corporations with the title “Basis
Adjustment to Stock of S Corps Making Charitable Contributions of Property”). The new
law provides:

(a) In General.—Paragraph (2) of section 1367(a) is amended by striking “December
31, 2009” and inserting “December 31, 2011”.
(b) Effective Date.—The amendment made by this section shall apply to contributions
made in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009.
Id.
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(2) Decreases in basis.—The basis of each shareholder’s stock
in an S corporation shall be decreased for any period (but not
below zero) by the sum of the following items determined with
respect to the shareholder for such period:
....
(B) the items of loss and deduction described in subparagraph
(A) of section 1366(a)(1),
....
The decrease under subparagraph (B) by reason of a charitable
contribution (as defined in section 170(c)) of property shall
be the amount equal to the shareholder’s pro rata share of the
adjusted basis of such property. The preceding sentence shall
not apply to contributions made in taxable years beginning after
December 31, 2009.44
This is an unusually obscure provision. There are two potential components of
a conservation easement contribution. The first component is the portion of the
easement representing gain in the value of the property underlying the easement
over the donor’s basis in that property. The second component is the donor’s
adjusted basis in the underlying property. The proportion of the fair market
value of the underlying property represented by gain and by basis are represented
in equal proportion in the appraised value of a conservation easement over the
underlying property. The 2010 Tax Act thus provides that the gain portion of
the easement’s value passes through to shareholders without regard to their basis
in their shares, whereas the basis portion of the easement’s value can only pass
through to the extent of the shareholders’ basis in their shares.45

44
26 U.S.C. § 1367(a)(2). The items of “loss and deduction” include charitable contribution
deductions. Id. § 1367(a)(2)(B).
45
Note that basis in a conservation easement is different from basis in the land subject to the
easement. A conservation easement’s basis is a function of the proportionate value of the underlying
land represented by the value of the easement, based upon a qualified appraisal of the value of the
easement. For example, assume that the donor’s basis in the underlying land is $100,000. Assume
that a qualified appraisal determines that the value of the land before the easement was $500,000
and after the easement was $250,000. The easement is worth $250,000 ($500,000 – $250,000)
and represents 50% of the value of the underlying land. Therefore, the donor’s basis in the easement
is $125,000 (50% x $250,000). See Hughes v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-094, 703 (2009)
(“[T]he basis of a conservation easement is equal to the adjusted basis of the entire property reduced
by the percentage decrease in the entire property’s fair market value as a result of the conservation easement.”).
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Using the example of Sam and Enid, suppose that Ranch Corporation’s basis
in the conservation easement contribution was $200,000. Thus, $300,000 of
the $500,000 easement contribution represents gain over the corporation’s basis
and can be passed through to Sam and Enid without regard to their basis in
their shares. $180,000 of this gain passes through to Sam, and $120,000 passes
through to Enid. However, only $100,000 of the corporation’s basis in the
contribution can be passed through to the shareholders because this amount can
only be passed through to the extent of the shareholders’ basis in their shares; in
this case $60,000 to Sam and $40,000 to Enid. Therefore, the total amount of
the deduction Sam can enjoy, at least in the year of the contribution, is $240,000
($180,000 plus $60,000) and by Enid is $160,000 ($120,000 plus $40,000).
Unless Sam and Enid are able to increase their basis (which has been reduced to
zero by the easement contribution) to at least $60,000 in Sam’s case and $40,000
in Enid’s case in the future, they will lose the benefit of the unused $100,000 of
the contribution deduction.

III. Judicial Decisions
Recent decisions from the United States Tax Court and the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois pertain to the tax law applicable
to conservation easements and conservation transactions.46 These decisions
underscore the government’s increasing focus on technical compliance and the
importance of paying close attention to the detail of statutory and regulatory
requirements in substantiating conservation easement contributions.

A. Substantiation
The substantiation of the contribution of a conservation easement can seem
trivial compared to the substance of negotiating a document that permanently
dictates the future use of a client’s land and complies with all of the requirements
for deductibility as per the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Code), as amended.47
It would, however, be a serious mistake to consider the attorney’s job complete
once the easement is put to record.
There are three components to properly substantiating a conservation easement
contribution: (1) a contemporaneous, formal, written acknowledgement in the
proper form from the donee organization; (2) a qualified appraisal of the value of
the conservation easement performed by an independent, qualified appraiser; and

This discussion is structured by category of issue, rather than by case decision. Therefore, a
case covering several different issues may be discussed more than once.
46

In order to successfully claim a tax deduction for the contribution of a conservation
easement, the donor must substantiate the fact that a contribution was made and the value of the
contribution. See infra notes 48–119 and accompanying text.
47
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(3) a properly completed and executed Form 8283 and the required schedule.48
Failure to comply with any one of these requirements could cost an easement
donor a deduction, as evidenced by several of the cases discussed below.

1. Contemporaneous Acknowledgement
In Gomez v. Commissioner, Mr. and Mrs. Gomez made contributions to their
church totaling over $6,500 in 2005.49 There was no issue that the contributions
were legitimate or that the recipient was a qualified exempt organization.
Furthermore, the recipient provided a written acknowledgement to Mr. and
Mrs. Gomez of their contributions.50 The tax court upheld the Internal Revenue
Service’s (IRS) disallowance of the charitable deduction for the contributions
because the church had not provided the required written acknowledgement in a
timely manner.51 In reaching this decision the tax court noted,
No deduction is allowed pursuant to section 170(a) for all
or part of any contribution of $250 or more unless the taxpayer
substantiates the contribution with a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment from the donee organization. Sec. 170(f )(8)(A).
Further, a written acknowledgment is contemporaneous if it
is obtained by the taxpayer on or before the earlier of (1) the
date on which the taxpayer files a return for the taxable year in
which the contribution was made, or (2) the due date (including
extensions) for filing such return. Sec. 170(f )(8)(C).52
Because the church did not provide the acknowledgement until the IRS had
already challenged the deduction, the acknowledgement did not conform to the
definition of “contemporaneous” provided in the above-cited statute.
In Bruzewicz v. United States, Elizabeth Bruzewicz and her husband, Howard
Prossnitz (Prossnitzes), contributed a façade easement over their residence in Oak
Park, Illinois, in 2002.53 For the contribution, the Prossnitzes claimed a federal

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c), -13(f ) (2011). Note that some experts are now suggesting that
easement donors also include in the packet of information substantiating their easement deduction
that accompanies their tax return (1) a copy of the recorded easement itself; (2) a copy of the
acknowledgement letter; (3) a copy of the subordination of mortgages to the easement (if there were
any); and (4) a copy of the documentation of the condition of the property subject to the easement
required by 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i). Stephen J. Small, Remarks at a webinar sponsored by
the Land Trust Alliance (Feb. 24, 2011).
48

49

T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-93, 2008 WL 2917654, at *1 (July 30, 2008).

50

Id. at *2.

51

Id. at *2–3.

52

Id. at *2 (emphasis added).

53

604 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1200 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
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income tax deduction of $216,000.54 The IRS challenged the deduction on a
number of technical grounds including: (1) failure to obtain a contemporaneous
written acknowledgement of the contribution from the donee organization;
(2) failure to comply with statutory requirements for qualified appraisals by
failing to include a description of the appraisers’ qualifications and a sufficiently
detailed description of the easement property; (3) failure to have both appraisers
sign Form 8283; (4) failure to include the cost basis of the contributed property
in Form 8283; and (5) failure to include “a proper basis for the valuation of the
easement or use the correct definition of market value.” 55 In deciding the case the
court said,
The critical question to be answered is whether the requirements
relate “to the substance or essence of the statute.” If so, strict
adherence to all statutory and regulatory requirements is a
precondition to an effective election. On the other hand, if the
requirements are procedural or directory in that they are not of
the essence of the thing to be done but are given with a view
to the orderly conduct of business, they may be fulfilled by
substantial, if not strict compliance.56

2. Acknowledgement Letter
In order to substantiate the deduction, the Prossnitzes were required to
provide an acknowledgement letter from the donee organization as was required
of Mr. and Mrs. Gomez:
No deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for any
contribution of $250 or more unless the taxpayer substantiates
the contribution by a contemporaneous written acknowledgment
of the contribution by the donee organization that meets the
requirements of subparagraph (B).
In turn subparagraph (B) states that the acknowledgment
must include (1) the amount of cash and a description of any
property other than cash contributed, (2) whether the donee

54

Id.

Id. at 1204–07. According to the Government, although the appraisal purports to use
the before and after method to determine the value of the easement, it really applies an arbitrary
percentage to the established “before” value of the property to arrive at the asserted “after” value,
rather than independently determining the real “after” value. Id. at 1207. Percentages can be used
instead of direct comparables to determine the value of a conservation easement. See infra notes
86–90 and accompanying text.
55

56

Bruzewicz, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1203 (quoting Taylor v. Comm’r, 67 T.C. 1071, 1077–78

(1977)).
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organization provided any goods or services in consideration for
any such property and (3) if goods or services were provided in
exchange, a description and good faith estimate of the value of
such goods or services. And to satisfy the “contemporaneous”
requirement, the acknowledgment must be obtained on or before
the date on which the taxpayer files a tax return containing the
charitable deduction or the deadline date for filing that return
(Section 170(f )(8)(C)).57
When the Prossnitzes contributed their façade easement, they also made two cash
contributions to the donee.58 The donee provided a contemporaneous written
acknowledgement of these contributions characterizing them as an “easement”
but did not mention or include a description of the façade easement.59
The court found that, in addition to other deficiencies in the acknowledgment
letter, there was no description of the easement or its terms. The court concluded,
“With no other writing offered by Prossnitzes in purported satisfaction of Section
170(f )(8)(A), they have flat-out violated its requirements.” 60
The court found the statutory requirement of a contemporaneous written
acknowledgement was “neither unclear nor confusing.” 61 The court then stated,
Nor can it be said that the statutory requirement is
“unimportant.” To begin with, its very inclusion in the Code
provision itself, rather than in accompanying regulations
promulgated by the Treasury Department, signals a negative
answer to that inquiry. And that result is underscored by the
nature of the statutorily stated consequence: “No deduction shall
be allowed . . . unless the taxpayer substantiates the contribution”
by the specified contemporaneous written acknowledgment by
the donee organization. Lacking that, the IRS is faced with
the absence of even a prima facie showing of the existence of a
substantial charitable contribution. Even though our tax system
is basically one of self-reporting, the statutory establishment of a
watershed-$250-beyond which validation is required in addition
to a taxpayer’s self-declaration cannot be said to be unimportant.
....

57

Id. at 1201 (quoting 26 U.S.C. 170(f )(8)(A) (2006)).

58

Id. at 1204.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.
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Prossnitzes’ total failure to comply with the just-discussed
statutory requirement is alone fatal to their claimed deduction
of the preservation façade easement.62

3. Appraisal
The Treasury Regulations (Regulations) list a number of items that must be
included in the appraisal of a conservation easement in order for that appraisal to
be considered a “qualified appraisal.” 63

Id. at 1204–05. Note that historic preservation easements limited to the protection of the
façade—the front or side of a building facing a public street—are no longer allowed by the Code.
See 26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(4)(B)(i).
62

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii) (2011). Bruzewicz suggests that failure to comply with
any one of the regulatory requirements may be fatal. See 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1205. The Regulations require,
63

(A) A description of the property in sufficient detail for a person who is not generally
familiar with the type of property to ascertain that the property that was appraised is
the property that was (or will be) contributed;
(B) In the case of tangible property, the physical condition of the property;
(C) The date (or expected date) of contribution to the donee;
(D) The terms of any agreement or understanding entered into (or expected to be
entered into) by or on behalf of the donor or donee that relates to the use, sale, or
other disposition of the property contributed, including, for example, the terms of
any agreement or understanding that—
(1) Restricts temporarily or permanently a donee’s right to use or dispose
of the donated property,
(2) Reserves to, or confers upon, anyone (other than a donee organization
or an organization participating with a donee organization in cooperative
fundraising) any right to the income from the contributed property or to
the possession of the property, including the right to vote donated securities,
to acquire the property by purchase or otherwise, or to designate the person
having such income, possession, or right to acquire, or
(3) Earmarks donated property for a particular use;
(E) The name, address and (if a taxpayer identification number is otherwise required
by section 6109 and the Regulations thereunder) the identifying number of the
qualified appraiser; and, if the qualified appraiser is acting in his or her capacity
as a partner in a partnership, an employee of any person (whether an individual,
corporation, or partnerships), or an independent contractor engaged by a person
other than the donor, the name, address, and taxpayer identification number (if a
number is otherwise required by section 6109 and the regulations thereunder) of the
partnership or the person who employs or engages the qualified appraiser;
(F) The qualifications of the qualified appraiser who signs the appraisal, including the
appraiser’s background, experience, education, and membership, if any, in professional
appraisal associations;
(G) A statement that the appraisal was prepared for income tax purposes;
(H) The date (or dates) on which the property was appraised;
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The Prossnitzes admitted the appraisal failed to include the appraisers’
qualifications but argued inclusion of the appraisers’ license numbers amounted
to substantial compliance.64 The court ruled the substantial compliance standard
requires the Prossnitzes demonstrate either that the requirements were so
insignificant or confusing that compliance was excused.65
The court found that the Regulation left “no doubt about what was
required.” 66 In another finding of particular relevance to conservation easement
appraisals, the court found:
[The Regulation] provides the IRS with some basis on which
to determine whether the valuation in an appraisal report is
competent and credible evidence to support what in some cases
may be a very large tax saving. And a statement of an appraiser’s
background and experience is particularly significant when
the subject of the appraisal is as esoteric and specialized as the
valuation of a real estate easement. For that reason as well, the
regulatory requirements cannot be viewed as unimportant.67
With respect to the requirement that the appraisal contain a description of the
contributed property, the court held that while the appraisal did contain a detailed
description of the residence that was subject to the façade easement, it did not
contain a description of the façade actually protected:
Those substantiation requirements are important, indeed
essential, to the review of charitable contribution deductions and
the reliability of corresponding appraisals. Absent a description
of the facade easement, the appraisal and its valuation of the
donated property are meaningless. There is no way for the IRS
or any outside party to judge whether the appraisal is reasonable
or to understand the basis for the valuation of such undefined

(I) The appraised fair market value (within the meaning of § 1.170A-1(c)(2)) of the
property on the date (or expected date) of contribution;
(J) The method of valuation used to determine the fair market value, such as the
income approach, the market-data approach, and the replacement-cost-lessdepreciation approach; and
(K) The specific basis for the valuation, such as specific comparable sales transactions
or statistical sampling, including a justification for using sampling and an explanation
of the sampling procedure employed.
26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii).
64

Bruzewicz, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1205.

65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.
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contributed property. Neither is the requirement in any way
confusing. There is really no excuse for Prossnitzes’ failure to
comply strictly with its terms.68
The court went on to say if the lack of an adequate description of the façade
had been the only deficiency in the donors’ substantiation, because the
easement itself provided a description and had been recorded shortly before
the appraisal date, it would have found substantial compliance.69 Nevertheless,
the court finally concluded that the donors had “utterly” failed to comply with
important substantiation requirements and upheld the government’s denial of
their deduction.70
Simmons v. Commissioner represents a kinder, gentler approach to substantia
tion requirements when compared to Gomez and Bruzewicz.71 In Simmons, the
IRS challenges were similar to those in Bruzewicz.72 The court, however, did not
entirely disallow the donor’s deduction for the contribution of a façade easement,
although the deduction was substantially reduced.73 In rather striking contrast
to Bruzewicz, the Simmons court found that although the donee organization
had provided no written acknowledgment of the easement contribution, it had
signed and dated the easement itself, which the court considered to be substantial compliance.74
The court also noted one of the principal requirements of the Code is that
the written acknowledgment include a statement detailing the amount of cash,
or a description of other property, received by the donor in exchange for the
contribution.75 However, this information is not available from the mere signature
of the donee on the easement. This detailed information would appear substantial
because the IRS cannot determine whether the value of the contribution
acknowledged in the letter must be offset by any return of value to the donor.
Nevertheless, the court made no further comment on the requirement or the lack
of compliance therewith.

68

Id. at 1206.

69

Id.

70

Id. at 1207.

See T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-208, 1567–70 (2009) (reducing substantially but not completely
eliminating deductions for contributions of a façade easement).
71

72
Compare id. at 1561–62 (describing the IRS’s assertion of a deficiency after the taxpayers
had claimed contribution deductions for conservation easements), with Bruzewicz, 604 F. Supp. 2d
at 1199 (describing a similar assertion by the IRS).
73

Simmons, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-208 at 1567–70.

74

Id. at 1565–67.

75

Id. at 1567; 26 U.S.C. § 170(f )(8)(B) (2006).
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Consolidated Investors Group v. Commissioner is another case in which the
donor failed to properly substantiate its deduction.76 In this case the appraisal
of the conservation easement was completed more than three months prior
to the contribution.77 There were other flaws as well, including failure to state
the date upon which the partnership contributed the property; failure to state
that the appraisal was prepared for income tax purposes; and failure to properly
document what the fair market value of the appraised property was on the date of
contribution.78 Nevertheless, the court found that these flaws were “insubstantial,”
in part because the information lacking from the appraisal had been provided to
the IRS in the Form 8283 and the appraisal had been provided, it just had been
prepared earlier than allowed by the Regulations.79
In the four cases previously discussed, failure to strictly comply with the
Regulations has produced dramatically different results. The outcome of each
case depended primarily upon the respective court’s application of the “substantial
compliance doctrine.” 80 Ultimately, the regulatory requirements are clear and
there is little excuse for failure to comply.
Complete, timely, and accurate substantiation, including (1) assuring receipt
of a contemporaneous written acknowledgment containing a description of goods
and services provided to the donor for the contribution; (2) proper completion
and execution of Form 8283 and the required schedule; and (3) an appraisal that
meets the extensive requirements of the tax law, are all responsibilities of the
donor’s attorney. While the substantial compliance doctrine may save some
transactions, no one should rely on this rather subjective and unpredictable doc
trine as a safety net.

4. The Use of Percentages in Valuing Conservation Easements
Based upon the reported cases, the government most frequently uses valuation
as grounds to challenge conservation easement deductions. In many cases,
conservation easement appraisals are flawed—some fatally, some marginally. But
76

T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-290, 2139 (2009).

Id. A qualified appraisal is one that was conducted no earlier than sixty days prior to the
date of the contribution, nor later than the due date for the return upon which the deduction is first
claimed, as delayed by any extensions. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-13(c)(3)(i)(A) (2011).
77

78

Consol. Investors Grp., T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-290 at 2139.

79

Id. at 2138–40.

See Hendrix v. United States, No. 2:09-CV-132, 2010 WL 2900391, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
July 21, 2010) (dealing with the contribution of a house); Lord v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010196, 1164–65 (2010) (dealing with a conservation easement contribution); Ney v. Comm’r, T.C.
Summ. Op. 2006-154, 2006 WL 2686850, at *2–10 (Sept. 19, 2006) (involving the bargain sale
of development rights on two properties). In each of these cases, failure to comply strictly with the
substantiation requirements resulted in the donors’ loss of their charitable contribution deduction.
Hendrix, 2010 WL 2900391, at *6–8; Lord, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-196 at 1165; Ney, 2006 WL
2686850, at *5–10.
80

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss2/6

18

Lindstrom: Recent Developments in the Law Affecting Conservation Easements:

2011

Conservation Easements

451

almost all appraisals need work after they are received from the appraiser and
before they go to the IRS. In representing a landowner contributing or bargain
selling a conservation easement, a significant part of any lawyer’s job is to review
the appraisal for compliance with federal tax requirements. One need not be an
appraiser to do this; the issues for which legal counsel should take responsibility
are purely legal and the rules are clearly set out in the Code and Regulations—and
expanded upon in numerous tax court opinions.81 Further, IRS agents do not
always know the law governing conservation easement appraisals.82
The need for compliance with technical substantiation requirements has
already been covered in preceding sections.83 The following are recently decided
issues dealing with the substance of valuation.
The Regulations state a preference for the use of comparables in valuing
conservation easements.84 However, finding conservation easements that have
been sold that are comparable to an easement currently being valued is often not
possible because so few conservation easements are sold in arm’s length, full-value
transactions. Therefore, the Regulations allow the use of the “before and after”
method in which the appraiser values property before placement of a conservation
easement and then values it after such placement, the difference being the value of
the conservation easement.85
One way appraisers have dealt with the lack of comparable easementrestricted properties is to apply a percentage reduction to the value of property
in its “before” easement condition in order to determine its “after” easement
value.86 The percentage is typically derived from a large number of easementencumbered property sales, or direct easement sales, obtained by the appraiser

81

See, e.g., Hughes v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-094 (2009).

In one audit, for example, the IRS challenged a conservation easement contribution
deduction because it had been made after the death of the landowner by the landowner’s executor.
The agent had never heard of the “post-mortem” election allowed by 26 U.S.C. § 2031(c)(8)(A)(iii),
(c)(8)(C), and (c)(9), which expressly provide for such deductions. In another example, the IRS
review letter criticizing an appraisal failed to understand how to calculate the required limitation
to basis applicable to conservation easement contributions made during the first year of the donor’s
ownership of the underlying property.
82

83

See supra Part III.A.

84

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(h)(3) (2011).

85

See id.

See, e.g., Strasburg v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2000-094, 510–11 (2000). Note in Strasburg
the appraiser derived a percentage diminution factor from a number of easement sales and sales of
property subject to easements. Id. The tax court rejected the easement sales data because details
allowing evaluation of the comparability of these sales was not included in the appraisal. Id. at
511. Of the thirty-one sales of property subject to easements that the appraiser used to determine a
percentage reduction, the court accepted only four as being comparable. Id.
86

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2011

19

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 11 [2011], No. 2, Art. 6

452

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 11

over time. However, these sales are not necessarily “comparable” to the property
being appraised because they may have occurred over a lengthy period of time and
may be geographically remote from the property being appraised. The Instructions
to Form 8283 expressly prohibit the use of percentages in appraisals of appreciated
property.87 Nevertheless, appraisers continue to use this method. Several recent
cases, discussed below, address this practice.
In Bruzewicz v. Commissioner mentioned above, the appraiser used a percentage
to determine the after value of the easement property.88 The court noted finding
comparables for determining the value of façade easements is difficult and cited
several cases in which the percentage approach was allowed.89 The court, however,
was highly critical of the superficiality of the appraiser’s analysis:
[The appraisal cites] the customary threefold approach to real
estate valuation: replacement cost, income capitalization and
sales comparison—but then it really applies those only to assert
the then present market value of the Prossnitzes’ home, and not to
evaluate the easement that the appraisers purport to be valuing. . . .
....
. . . In this Court’s view that approach would most likely face real
difficulty if this case had to reach trial.90
Because the court ruled the donors failed to comply with other substantiation
requirements, it upheld the government’s disallowance of the easement deduction
without examining further the valuation issue.

Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of the Treasury, Cat. No. 62730, Instructions for Form
8283: Noncash Charitable Contributions 3 (2006) [hereinafter IRS Form 8283 Instructions]
(“The FMV of a conservation easement cannot be determined by applying a standard percentage to
the FMV of the underlying property.”).
87

88

604 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1201, 1207 (N.D. Ill. 2009).

Id. at 1207 (“[C]omparable sales transactions involving real estate with similar facade
easements are not always available. In a number of cases percentage reductions have been accepted
to determine an easement’s value based on qualitative factors that suggest such a value.” (citing
Griffin v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1560 (1989); Losch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909
(1988); Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 624 (1988))). Note that the cases cited by the
court were both decided prior to the date of the current instructions for Form 8283. Compare id.
(citing cases decided in 1988 and 1989), with IRS Form 8283 Instructions, supra note 87, at 1
(specifying rules revised in December 2006).
89

90

Bruzewicz, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 1208 (emphasis added).
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In Hughes v. Commissioner, the appraiser for Hughes, relying on data from six
“comparable” properties, determined the reduction in value of Hughes’ property
due to the conservation easement was 70%.91 In response, the government
appraiser relied on a “matrix.” 92 According to the court:
The matrix incorporated information from 35 easementencumbered properties and illustrated generally that the amount
of diminution caused by an easement is related to the degree
to which the easement changes a property’s highest and best
use. According to Mr. Packard [the IRS’s appraiser], the matrix
showed that the diminution in value “for those properties that
did not experience a change in highest and best use . . . is quite
small and was often found to be 0%”.93
Accordingly, the government’s position was the conservation easement had no
effect on the value of the property to which it was subject.
Developed by a group of IRS engineers who collected data on all of the land
in Colorado sold subject to conservation easements, the matrix extracted the
thirty-five sales of easement encumbered property.94 From those sales the IRS
derived a series of percentages representing the reduction in value of property
due to conservation easements.95 The reduction was a function of the number of
potential residences removed from the property by the easement.96
For example, the matrix asserted where the pre-easement development
potential of property was five residences or more, and the post-easement potential
was five residences or more, the reduction in the pre-easement value due to the
easement was zero.97 On its face, this seems obvious. However, suppose before an

T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-094, 711 (2009). This case is a good primer on the dos and don’ts of
appraising a conservation easement. However, for purposes of this discussion, the focus will be on
the use of percentages by the appraisers for both the government and Hughes to determine the value
of the conservation easement in question.
91

92

Id. at 712.

93

Id.

94

IRS Engineers Study (on file with author).

95

Id.

96

Id.

Id. The matrix also purported to show that if the development potential of easement
property before the easement was in place was only one home site and the easement allowed no
home sites, the reduction in value would range between 27% and 74%. Id. If the pre-easement
development potential was three home sites and the easement eliminated all of them, the reduction
in value would be 80%, whereas if the easement only eliminated two of the three home sites, the
reduction would be between 0% and 20%. Id.
97
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easement was in place a property could have been developed into sixty-eight home
sites and after the easement it could only be developed into ten.98 The matrix
suggests that the value of such a conservation easement is zero. If there were no
demand for residential development of the subject property, this conclusion might
be correct. If, on the other hand, demand exists for such development it is hard
to understand how the conclusion suggested by the matrix is correct. In other
words, one cannot determine the value of a conservation easement using abstract
measures. This is essentially what the court found.99 The court commented on the
landowner’s appraiser’s use of percentages:
We note as well that Mr. Weston’s [the landowner’s appraiser]
report lacks critical information about the comparable properties
he considered; namely the highest and best use of the properties
before they were encumbered by conservation easements.
Without this information it is impossible to tell how much
effect the easements had on the properties’ fair market values.100
The court similarly commented on the government appraiser’s use of the matrix:
“We also disagree with Mr. Packard’s use of the matrix. Because it included general
information that did not have a specific connection to the Bull Mountain and
Sylvester parcels, we afforded it little weight in our analysis.”101
Simmons v. Commissioner is another case involving a façade easement.102 An
important issue in this case revolved around the fact that the two properties subject
to the easement were already subject to local historic preservation regulations.103
The government argued the local regulations already limited the use of the
properties in a manner similar to the easement, and therefore, the easement
did not affect the value of either property.104 The court found the additional
restrictions imposed on the properties over and above the local regulations did in
fact result in a further reduction in the value of the properties, thus allowing the
donors about one-third of the deductions they originally claimed.105

98
Cf. Hughes, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-094 at 711 (acknowledging the significant reduction in the
allowed density of home sites).
99

See id. at 712–13.

100

Id. at 712 n.29.

101

Id. at 712 n.30.

102

T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-208, 1562 (2009); see supra Part III.A.3.

103

Simmons, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-208 at 1568–69.

104

Id.

105

Id. at 1569–70.
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In this case, the Simmons’ appraiser determined the fair market value of
the properties before the easement based upon its highest and best use.106 The
appraiser then applied a percentage to determine the effect of the easement on the
value of the two properties: a 13% diminution for one property and 11% for the
other.107 The court, considering the extent to which the properties were already
restricted by the local regulations and the relatively minor additional limitations
imposed by the easements, concluded a 5% reduction was more appropriate.108
The important point here is that both the court and the Simmons’ appraiser
relied entirely on a percentage reduction in the pre-easement value of the property
subject to the easement in determining the value of the easement.109 There was
no evidence as to how either the court or the Simmons’ appraiser arrived at
these percentages, nor was there any critical discussion of the use of percentages.
The court’s use of 5% appeared as arbitrary as the landowners’ appraiser’s use of
11% and 13%. The percentage approach to easement valuation was simply not
an issue.
Scheidelman v. Commissioner presented yet another façade easement case in
which Ms. Scheidelman’s appraiser, Drazner, relied on a percentage reduction in
the unrestricted value of the structure to determine the value of the easement.110
The desirability of the use of percentages in easement appraisals is explained in
the Scheidelmans’ appraisal:
[I]t is extremely difficult for appraisers to estimate the probable
and possible impact on a property’s value by the imposition of a
façade conservation easement that is granted in perpetuity. For
most attached row properties in New York City, where there are
many municipal regulations restricting changes to properties
located in historic districts, the façade easement value tends to be
about 11–11.5% of the total value of the property. That figure
is based on the appraiser’s experience as to what the Internal
Revenue Service has found acceptable (on prior appraisals).
....

106

Id. at 1568.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 1569–70.

109

Id. at 1568–70.

T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-151, 910–12 (2010). Façade easements, no longer permitted by the
Code, have been heavily targeted by the IRS due to the potential for abuse and the arguably minimal
impact on value resulting from the easements. However, while the substance of façade easement
is considerably different than that of a conservation easement on land, the principles invoked
by the IRS in its numerous challenges to façade easements are the same as those that apply to
land easements.
110
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It is now generally recognized by the Internal Revenue Service
that the donation of a façade easement of a property results in
a loss of value . . . between 10% and 15%. The donation of a
commercial property results in a loss of value of between 10% or
12% or higher if development rights are lost. The inclusive data
support at least these ranges, depending on how extensive the
façade area is in relation to the land parcel.111
The court itself cited an article produced by the IRS supporting the use of
percentages in determining the value of historic façade easements.112 However,
while acknowledging courts in the past have accepted the percentage approach
to after-easement valuation, the court rejected the use of a set percentage, stating
“valuation itself is still a question of facts and circumstances.” 113 Specifically, the
court found:
Drazner’s report failed to outline and analyze qualitative factors
for the Vanderbilt [Scheidelman’s residence] property.
Petitioners argue that the Drazner report outlined the
methodology set forth to determine the “after” fair market value
and assert that Drazner explained at trial that his appraisal was
“not mechanical, it was reasoned.” However, the application
of a percentage to the fair market value before conveyance of the
façade easement, without explanation, cannot constitute a method
of valuation as contemplated under section 1.170A-13(c)(3)(ii),
Income Tax Regs. Drazner’s report applied mechanically a
percentage with no demonstrated support as to its derivation, other
than acceptance of similar percentages in prior controversies.
Further, no meaningful analysis was provided in the Drazner

111

Id. at 911–12.

112

Id. at 912. The Scheidelman court noted,
An article entitled “Facade Easement Contributions” was prepared by Mark
Primoli of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) sometime before 2002 and was included
as a part of the IRS’ 1994 Market Segment Specialization Program Audit Technique
Guide on the Rehabilitation Tax Credit—used to assist in training IRS personnel. The
article stated that
Internal Revenue Service Engineers have concluded that the proper
valuation of a facade easement should range from approximately 10%
to 15% of the value of the property. Once fair market values have been
determined, the same ratios are used to allocate the basis of the building
and the underlying land to the facade easement for both rehabilitation tax
credit and depreciation purposes. See Treasury Regulation 1.170A14(h).

Id.
113

Id. at 916 (quoting Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 624 (1988)).
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report to explain why Drazner applied 11.33 percent to the
before fair market value of the property to calculate the façade
easement value . . . .114
The court concluded the Scheidelman’s appraisal was not a “qualified appraisal”
and denied the deduction.115
It is easy to understand why appraisers want to use percentages derived from
a number of different transactions to determine the after value of property subject
to easements. Finding real comparable sales of property subject to easements that
are in the vicinity of the property being valued and similar in characteristics and
timing of the sale can be extremely difficult. There is a dearth of such comparables
in virtually every market.
In addition to the foregoing cases critical of utilizing the percentage approach,
in 2007 the IRS expressly rejected the use of percentages to determine the value of
façade easements:
The value of each easement is based on the particular facts
and circumstances of each property on which the façade is located
and the particular restrictions imposed. There was and is no
“generally recognized” percentage by which an easement reduces
the value of property. Consequently, unless there is a substantial
record of sales of easements comparable to the donated easement (in
which case the appraisal would be based on the comparables, see
§ 1.170A-14(h)(3)(i)), an appraisal that does not value the property
both before and after the donation will not be accepted by the Service
to substantiate the deduction.116
Notwithstanding the IRS’s position and the Instructions to Form 8283, the
preceding cases demonstrate that the courts have not completely ruled out
the use of percentages to determine after-easement values. It is, however,
clear that the courts expect the data from which any percentages are derived
should be (1) described in the appraisal report and (2) relevant to the property

114

Id. (emphasis added).

Id. at 918–19. Note that the consequence here of failure to comply with the requirements
for a qualified appraisal was not a reduction by the court in the amount of the deduction claimed
but a disallowance of the entire deduction. Id.
115

I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. Mem. 2007-38-013, 2007 WL 2746198 (Aug. 9, 2007)
(emphasis added).
116
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being appraised.117 Failure to thoroughly substantiate percentages used in
valuing easements risks not just a reduction in valuation but a denial of the
deduction entirely.
The rulings and Chief Counsel Advisory memorandum discussed above (with
the exception of Hughes) are limited to façade easement appraisals.118 However,
appraisers occasionally attempt to use the percentage approach to valuing
conservation easements on land. An appraisal of an easement on land in Sublette
County, Wyoming, serves as one example. The appraiser derived a percentage
from a “database” of sales of properties subject to conservation easements. The
percentage was applied to the value of the land before the easement was in place
to determine the reduction in value attributable to the easement. Among the
sales contained in the database were sales of easement-restricted land in Teton
County, Wyoming.
Elimination of the highly inflated value of the Teton County home sites by
conservation easements resulted in very significant reductions in the before value
of that land simply because each home site eliminated was so highly valued. Use of
this data significantly skewed the percentage indicated by the sales, thus resulting
in a reduction in value that did not represent the value of Sublette County home
sites. While home site values in Sublette County were certainly above average,
they were far from comparable to those in Teton County. A percentage reduction
influenced by Teton County sales data simply inaccurately reflected the value of
conservation easements in Sublette County. It is this kind of indiscriminate use of
widely ranging sales without regard to actual comparability that makes appraisals
relying on percentages highly vulnerable and inadvisable. There is no reason why
the principles applicable to the use of percentages in determining the value of
façade easements cannot be applied to land easements—certainly the skepticism
of the court in Hughes indicates this.119

B. Cash Gifts in Connection with Easement Contributions
As a general practice most land trusts request, or require, that landowners
contributing conservation easements also make a cash contribution to cover the

See Scheidelman, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-151 at 916–18 (noting the use of percentage
deductions without an explanation of relevance made the appraisal deficient); Hughes v. Comm’r,
T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-094, 712 nn.29–30 (2009) (noting a report lacked critical information with no
specific relevance to the parcels in question).
117

118
See supra notes 83–117 and accompanying text. Note that the proscription on the use of
percentages in easement appraisals is not limited to façade easements. IRS Form 8283 Instructions,
supra note 87, at 3–4.
119
Cf. Hughes, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-094 at 712–13 (finding expert opinions using percentage
reductions to appraise easement values problematic).
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cost of monitoring and enforcing the easement “in perpetuity.”120 While not
expressly required by the tax law, the Regulations provide “[t]o be considered an
eligible donee under this section, an organization must . . . have the resources to
enforce the restrictions . . . . A qualified organization need not set aside funds to
enforce the restrictions that are the subject of the contribution.” 121
The Land Trust Alliance, a national umbrella organization for over 1700 land
trusts, recommends that,
The land trust determines the long-term stewardship and
enforcement expenses of each easement transaction and secures
the dedicated or operating funds to cover current and future
expenses. If funds are not secured at or before the completion
of the transaction, the land trust has a plan to secure these funds
and has a policy committing the funds to this purpose.122
In addition, Form 990, which requires an annual filing by land trusts and other
exempt organizations, expressly requires land trusts to report the amount of
staff time and money spent annually monitoring and enforcing conservation
easements.123 One Wyoming land trust has analyzed that the costs of annual
monitoring run about $2800 per easement/landowner per year. Endowment of
this annual cost, assuming a 2.5% rate of return, would require $112,000.
Raising the money necessary to fund the monitoring and enforcement of
easements in order to comply with tax law and discharge a land trust’s “perpetual”
obligations under the terms of the conservation easement is a critical and necessary
issue for land trusts. Two recent tax court decisions involve government challenges
to the deductibility of such cash payments.
In Kaufman v. Commissioner, another façade easement case, the government
challenged the deductibility of the easement on the grounds the easement was not
perpetual.124 The government also contested the deductibility of a cash payment
made by the Kaufmans to assist the donee in monitoring and enforcing the

See Land Trust Alliance, Land Trust Standards and Practices 6, 8, 13–16 (2d prtg.
2007) [hereinafter Land Trust Alliance], available at http://www.landtrustalliance.org/training/
sp/lt-standards-practices07.pdf.
120

121

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (2011).

122

Land Trust Alliance, supra note 120, at 14.

Internal Revenue Serv., Dep’t of the Treasury, OMB No. 1545-0047, Schedule D 
(Form 990): Supplemental Financial Statements pt. II, l, 7 (2010) [hereinafter IRS Form 990
Schedule D].
123

124

134 T.C. No. 9, 107 (2010); see also infra note 152 and accompanying text.
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easement.125 While the court did not rule on this latter challenge, finding the
Kaufmans had raised sufficient factual issues to survive the government’s motion
for summary judgment, it did describe the issue in some detail.126
The Kaufmans entered into an agreement with the National Architectural
Trust (NAT) to contribute a façade easement on their property.127 Included in
the agreement was a requirement that the Kaufmans make a cash contribution
to NAT equal to a percentage of the estimated value of the easement.128 The
payment was to be made in advance of the contribution of the easement itself.129
The agreement also provided that in the event the easement was appraised at no
value, NAT would refund the payment to the Kaufmans.130
The government challenged the deductibility of the payment on two grounds.
First, the government argued that because the contribution could be refunded if
the easement had no value, it was a conditional gift and thus not deductible.131
Second, because the contribution was required in order for NAT to accept the
easement contribution, the cash contribution was a quid pro quo payment and
was therefore not deductible.132
The Kaufmans responded to the first argument by admitting the contribution
was conditional but cited an exception to the rule which states that conditional
gifts are not deductible; the exception is for a condition “so remote as to be
negligible.”133 The Kaufmans argued there was virtually no chance the façade
easement would be found to have no value at all, and therefore the condition was
“so remote as to be negligible.” 134 The court ruled the resolution of this question
was inherently factual and denied the IRS’s motion for summary judgment on
that issue.135
With respect to the government’s argument that the cash payment was
a quid pro quo payment, the court noted that the government’s argument
appeared to be that “in return for the cash contribution, NAT accepted the façade

125

Kaufman, 134 T.C. at 109–10.

126

Id.

127

Id. at 107–08.

128

Id. at 108.

129

Id.

130

Id. at 109.

131

Id. (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(e) (2010)).

132

Id. at 109–10 (citing Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 690 (1989) (emphasis added)).

133

Id. at 109 (discussing the exception set forth in 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-1(e)).

134

Id.

135

Id.
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easement contribution so that petitioners could claim a charitable contribution
deduction.”136 The court ruled that even if the Kaufmans were required to make
the cash payment, it was not convinced the fact the payment was required was
sufficient to deny the deduction and denied the motion for summary judgment
on that issue as well.137
In Scheidelman v. Commissioner, Ms. Scheidelman, like the Kaufmans, was
required to make a cash contribution in connection with her façade easement
contribution to NAT.138 Again, the government claimed that the payment was
not deductible because it was a quid pro quo payment.139 The court addressed
this challenge in detail, summarizing the basic rules governing deductibility of
a contribution:
A payment of cash to a qualified organization may be
deductible under section 170 if the payment is a “contribution
or gift”. A payment of money or transfer of property generally
cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor
expects a substantial benefit in return. See United States v. Am.
Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116 (1986).
If a transaction is structured in the form of a quid pro
quo, where it is understood that the taxpayer’s money
will not pass to the charitable organization unless the
taxpayer receives a specific benefit in return, and where
the taxpayer cannot receive the benefit unless he pays
the required price, then the transaction does not qualify
for the deduction under section 170.
Graham v. Commissioner, 822 F.2d 844, 849 (9th Cir.1987),
affd. sub nom. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
A taxpayer who receives or expects to receive a benefit in
return for a purported contribution may nonetheless be allowed
a deduction if the money or property transferred clearly exceeds
the benefit received and the excess is given with the intent to

136

Id. at 110.

Id. Even if the circumstances of the payment indicated that it could have a dual character
as partially required and partially charitable, summary judgment would have been improper because
such circumstances would have constituted a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986) (acknowledging the impropriety of summary judgment where
there is a triable issue of genuine material fact).
137

138

T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-151, 910 (2010).

139

See id. at 919. Note that Scheidelman was decided in July 2010 and Kaufman in April 2010.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2011

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 11 [2011], No. 2, Art. 6

462

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 11

make a gift. See United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, supra at
117. A taxpayer claiming a charitable contribution deduction
under this “dual character” theory, however, “must at a minimum
demonstrate that . . . [she] purposely contributed money or
property in excess of the value of any benefit . . . [she] received
in return.” Id. at 117–118.140
The court ruled Ms. Scheidelman failed to refute the government’s position
and denied her claimed deduction for the cash payment.141 A significant problem
for Ms. Scheidelman was that NAT “required” the cash “contribution” as a precondition to acceptance of the easement.142 This immediately jeopardized the
deduction. Had NAT “suggested,” “recommended,” or even “requested” the cash
payment rather than making it a mandatory part of acceptance of the easement,
the outcome would have been different.
Raising funds for the monitoring and enforcement of conservation easements
is of fundamental importance for land trusts. If a land trust can afford to ask for,
but not require, a contribution from an easement donor and if the land trust has
a record of accepting easements without payment of such a contribution, the
contribution should be deductible.143
If the land trust requires the contribution directly, or if the land trust has a
history indicating it will not accept easement contributions without accompanying
cash contributions, then the cash payment is not deductible unless it is treated as a
“dual character” contribution.144 The difference is deductible, provided that both
the donee and donor intend that the difference be a charitable contribution.145
However, in the case of a cash contribution accompanying the contribution
of a conservation easement, the question becomes: What has the donor received
from the donee in exchange for the cash contribution? If the donor has received
goods and services in the form of baseline report preparation, surveys, or other
similar benefits, and the donee quantifies the value of those benefits, and they are
less than the contribution, assuming proper substantiation, the donor may deduct

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

Id. at 910.

United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117–18 (1986) (holding that a purely
voluntary payment to a public charity, made with the intention of making a charitable contribution,
is deductible as a charitable contribution).
143

144
See id. at 117 (holding that a dual character contribution is one in which the donor receives
something from the donee in exchange for a contribution that is less valuable than the contribution).
145

Id.
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the difference between the contribution and the value of the goods and services
received in exchange.146
On the other hand, if what the donor has received is the donee’s agreement to
accept the conservation easement, the government may argue that the value of the
goods and services received in exchange for that contribution is the value of the
tax deduction, in which case the value received would significantly offset the value
of the cash contribution.147 The problem with this argument is that by accepting
the conservation easement the donee has caused the donor to give up substantial
development value typically far in excess of the value of the tax deduction. It is
hard to see how the government could be successful in ignoring what the donor
gave up to obtain the deduction by arguing the tax deduction was a net benefit to
the donor.
If a land trust truly cannot afford to accept easement contributions without
an accompanying cash contribution, it should simply require the contribution
and make no effort to make that contribution deductible. In most cases the
tax deduction from the easement contribution is far more substantial than the
deduction from the cash contribution would be, and the deduction more than
covers the cost to the donor of making the cash contribution.148 Furthermore, if
the donor is serious about conserving his or her land, it is in the easement donor’s
interest to ensure that the contributed conservation easement can be enforced
long after the donor is gone.

C. Subordinations
In order for the contribution of a conservation easement to be deductible, the
easement must be granted in perpetuity.149 Any mortgage in force at the time of
the contribution must be subordinated to the “right of the qualified organization
to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity.” 150 In the past,

146
Id. at 113, 117. Written acknowledgment of the contribution from the donee and a
statement of the value and nature of goods and services received in exchange is required for the
donation to be allowable. 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i) (2011). Baseline reports, descriptions of
the natural resources, and other features of property to be made subject to a conservation easement
satisfy this requirement. See id.; see also supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text.
147
See Kaufman v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. No. 9, 110 (2010) (“Respondent seems to argue that,
in return for the cash contribution, NAT [the donee] accepted the facade easement contribution so
that petitioners could claim a charitable contribution deduction.”).
148
Note that in Scheidelman, the easement donor did not claim a deduction for the cash
contribution until her deduction for contribution of the conservation easement was challenged.
T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-151, 919 (2010).
149

26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(b)(2), (g)(1).

150

Id. § 1.170A-14(g)(2).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2011

31

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 11 [2011], No. 2, Art. 6

464

Wyoming Law Review

Vol. 11

compliance with this requirement was not typically a problem. However, as land
values recently have declined and foreclosures increased, mortgagees are becoming
(as they should be) more cautious about subordinating their rights to conservation
easements. After all, conservation easements can strip away a considerable part of
the value of the mortgagee’s security. Of course, so long as there remains sufficient
equity in the easement property after the easement is in place to adequately secure
the mortgagee’s interests, there should be no problem.151
The Kaufman case, discussed above, provides the first recorded decision
dealing with subordination and conservation easements.152 The Kaufmans lost
their façade easement deduction because the subordination of the mortgage on
their residence failed to satisfy the requirements of 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(2).
Specifically, the subordination gave the mortgagor a first claim to any condemnation
awards, or the proceeds of any insurance payments, that might be generated from
a condemnation or destruction of all or a portion of the property subject to the
façade easement.
The court noted the law requires a deductible easement vest the donee
organization with a property right that has a value that is a fixed percentage of
the value of the underlying property.153 That value is equal to the percentage of
the unrestricted value of the property represented by the easement.154 As the court
found, the law requires,
when a change in conditions give rise to the extinguishment of a
perpetual conservation restriction . . . , the donee organization,
on a subsequent sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion of the
subject property, must be entitled to a portion of the proceeds
at least equal to that proportionate value of the perpetual
conservation restriction . . . .155
The Kaufmans argued that, in the event of the extinguishment of the easement,
the question of whether or not the donee was entitled to its proportionate share
of proceeds was a question of fact and that the government’s motion for summary
judgment should be denied.156 However, the court ruled the donee’s right to its
151
However, the author has run into situations where mortgagees balked at subordinations
even when it was clear that the remaining security was vastly more valuable than the secured debt
and where the easement was granted to obtain approval of an increase in density on a portion of
the mortgagee’s security that would enhance its value. As is typical with pendulum swings, at either
extreme they are rarely sensitive to facts.
152

See generally Kaufman, 134 T.C. No. 9.

153

Id. at 108.

154

Id.

155

Id. (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii)).

156

Id. at 109.
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proportionate share of the proceeds had to be absolute, not conditional.157 The
court found the mere possibility that the mortgagee might be entitled to the
proceeds resulting from condemnation or destruction of the easement property
denied the donee its required absolute right and, as a matter of law, violated the
requirements for deductibility.158 The court granted the government’s motion for
summary judgment on this issue, thus effectively disposing of the case and the
Kaufman’s $220,000 income tax deduction.159
One of the fundamental requirements for the deductibility of a conservation
easement is that the easement be permanent.160 If, for any reason, the easement
is extinguished in whole, or in part, and the property is subsequently sold, a
portion of the sales proceeds represents the easement and must go to the land
trust.161 As Kaufman makes clear, failure to guarantee that such proceeds go to the
holder of the easement violates the requirement that the conservation easement
be perpetual.162
The law speaks specifically of mortgages; however, there are other recorded
interests that may also preempt an easement holder’s right to the required portion
of proceeds.163 While the letter of the law is limited to mortgages, the spirit of the
law requires that nothing intervene in the rights of the easement holder to receive
proceeds resulting from the extinguishment of a conservation easement.
Given the fact that a failure to comply strictly with the law regarding the
deductibility of a conservation easement contribution may result in the permanent
restriction of property but no tax deduction for that restriction, it would seem
157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

26 U.S.C. § 170(h)(2)(C) (2006).

161

Kaufman, 134 T.C. at 108–09 (citing 26 C.F.R. § 1.170A-14(g)(6) (2011)).

Id. at 109. The government’s opening brief filed in Kaufman cited several examples of
mortgage subordination clauses of which it approved. One was from the Compact of Cape Cod
Conservation Trusts, which reads as follows:
162

[Name and address of financial institution] (“Mortgagee”), present holder of a
mortgage from, [donors] (“Mortgagor”), recorded on [date] in the [County] Registry
of Deeds in Deed Book [ ] Page [ ], for consideration paid, hereby recognizes and
assents to the terms and provisions of a Conservation Restriction running to the
Conservation Trust, to be recorded herewith, and agrees to subordinate and hold its
mortgage subject to the terms and provisions of said Conservation Restriction to the
same extent as if said mortgage had been recorded subsequent to the recording of
the Conservation Restriction, and the undersigned shall, in the exercise of its rights
pursuant to said instrument, recognize the terms and provisions of the aforesaid
Conservation Restriction.
Brief of Respondent at n.13, Kaufman, 134 T.C. No. 9 (No. 15997-09).
E.g., provisions in restrictive covenants imposing a lien on property for the payment of dues
and assessments.
163
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best to honor the spirit of the law here, not just the letter. In other words, any
interest pre-existing recordation of a conservation easement that might preempt
the easement holder’s right to enforce the easement, or to receive proceeds from
extinguishment of the easement, should be unconditionally subordinated to the
land trust’s right to enforce the conservation purposes of the gift in perpetuity.
In general it is recommended that taxpayers include a copy of any
subordination with the packet of information substantiating charitable deductions
for conservation easements. It is also recommended that this packet include a
completely-filled-out Form 8283, the schedule required by the instructions to
Form 8283, a copy of the “documentation” (typically known as the baseline, or
baseline inventory) required by 26 C.F.R § 1.170A-14(g)(5)(i), a copy of the
recorded easement and, if the conservation easement exceeds $500,000, a copy of
the qualified appraisal.

D. Trusts
Land is often held in trust. Typically these trusts are so-called “grantor” trusts
which reserve to the settlor the right to revoke or modify the trust at will.164
Grantor trusts are ignored for tax purposes, and the contribution of a conservation
easement by a grantor trust is treated the same as though the owner of the trust
had made the contribution.165
In Goldsby v. Commissioner, Mr. Goldsby created a trust naming his son
the trustee and sole income beneficiary.166 The court determined that the son
was the owner of the income of the trust because he had the right to direct all
of the income to himself or for his own benefit.167 However, the trust provided

164
26 U.S.C. § 674(a). “Grantor trust” is a term used to describe any trust over which the
grantor or other owner retains the power to control or direct the trust income or assets. See id.
§§ 671–679 (defining the characteristics of grantor trusts). If a grantor retains certain powers over
or benefits in a trust, the income of the trust will be taxed to the grantor, rather than to the trust.
Id. §§ 61, 671. These powers include, among others, the power to decide who receives income,
the power to vote or to direct the vote of the stock held by the trust or to control the investment
of the trust funds, and the power to revoke the trust. Id. §§ 673–677. All “revocable trusts” are
by definition grantor trusts. Id. § 676(a). An “irrevocable trust” can be treated as a grantor trust
if any of the definitions contained in Internal Revenue Code §§ 671, 673, 674, 675, 676, or
677 are met. See id. §§ 674(b), 677(a) (excepting only some forms of irrevocable trusts from the
purview of grantor trusts). If a trust is a grantor trust, then the grantor is treated as the owner of
the assets, the trust is disregarded as a separate tax entity, and all income is taxed to the grantor. Id.
§§ 61, 671; see Abusive Trust Tax Evasion Schemes—Questions and Answers, IRS.gov, http://www.irs.
gov/businesses/small/article/0,,id=106551,00.html (last updated Jan. 21, 2011) (anticipating and
answering questions about forms of trusts and related evasion schemes).
165

26 U.S.C. §§ 61, 671.

166

T.C.M. (RIA) 2006-274, 1754 (2006).

167

Id. at 1757.
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that the corpus of the trust was to be distributed to Mr. Goldsby’s grandchildren
upon his son’s death.168 Over the years the trust acquired substantial real property
which it ultimately protected with conservation easements.169 The sole income
beneficiary, the son, claimed the value of these contributions as deductions on his
individual income tax return believing that the deductions passed through to him
under grantor trust principles.170 The government challenged both the easement’s
valuation and the son’s right to take the deductions.171
The court ruled that because the son had no right to the land in the trust (the
corpus) he did not own the corpus.172 Contributions of any portion of the trust
owned by a beneficiary are deductible by the beneficiary; however, contributions
from portions of a trust not owned by a beneficiary are not deductible by the
beneficiary.173 The court found that the conservation easements, having been
conveyed over property comprising the corpus of the trust, did not pass through to
the beneficiary. Therefore, the court denied the beneficiary’s right to a deduction:
A person is treated as the owner of any portion of a trust with
respect to which that person has the power, solely exercisable by
himself or herself, to vest the corpus or the income in himself
or herself. When a person is treated as the owner of a portion
of a trust under section 678, special rules apply to not tax the
trust directly. Instead, the person treated as the owner takes
into account the trust’s items of income, deduction, and credit
attributable to that portion of the trust.
If the trust makes a donation to charity from that portion of
the trust, the person who is treated as the owner of that portion
may cumulate those charitable donations with the person’s own
charitable donations and deduct them under section 170.174
There are other issues implicating contribution of a conservation easement
by an irrevocable trust. An important one is the fiduciary obligation of a trustee
to protect the corpus and the interest of the beneficiaries.175 In the absence of
express authority in the trust instrument for the contribution of trust assets to

168

Id. at 1754.

169

Id. at 1755.

170

Id.

171

Id. at 1756.

172

Id. at 1757.

173

Id. at 1756–57.

174

Id. at 1756 (citations omitted).

175

Id. at 1757 & n.5.
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charities, any charitable contribution would seem to violate the trustee’s fiduciary
obligation. Obtaining judicial authority for such contributions, particularly where
there are minor or unborn beneficiaries, is likely to be difficult, if not impossible.
Goldsby thus underscores the importance of determining the consequences of title
to property for the deductibility of contributions made by the title holder.176

E. Sham Transactions
The phrase “sham transactions” is intended to be inclusive of the various
labels applied to efforts to challenge tax-related transactions for lack of substance,
including the economic substance doctrine, the business purpose doctrine, and
the step transaction doctrine. The issues discussed in the cases above have been
largely technical, and the law governing those issues, while occasionally complex,
is fairly clear-cut. On the other hand, the law governing sham transactions is both
multi-faceted and subjective.177 Sham transactions have largely been limited to
highly complex business structures intended to take maximum advantage, without
real substance, of various features of the Code.178 Conservation transactions
have typically not inhabited such questionable territory.179 However, the recent
case of Klauer v. Commissioner demonstrates that the government does not
consider conservation transactions immune from sham transaction challenges.180
In addition to Klauer, Congress recently enacted a statutory definition of the
“economic substance doctrine,” which sets standards for the evaluation of various
transactions’ substance versus form.181 The provisions and possible application of
this new law to conservation transactions are considered first, followed by a look
at Klauer.

176
See id. at 1758–59 (determining that deductions were not available to the petitioner
because he did not hold proper title). Not only are trusts problematic, so too are corporations.
C. Timothy Lindstrom, A Tax Guide to Conservation Easements 133–42 (2008) (discussing the
implications for easement contributions of different types of landowner entities).

See Robert W. Wood, Economic Substance: Who and Why?, 11 M&A Tax Rep., May 2003,
at 1. A “sham transaction” is one entered into for no business or economic purpose other than the
avoidance of tax. Id.
177

See, e.g., Cottage Sav. Ass’n v. Comm’r, 499 U.S. 554, 556–58 (1991) (analyzing the nature
of a technical regulatory transaction by a savings and loan association); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465, 467 (1935) (analyzing the nature of a reorganization of a large corporation).
178

Although, until recently, transactions involving conservation easements were included on
the IRS’s “Dirty Dozen” listing of questionable tax shelters.
179

See T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-65 (2010); see also infra notes 199–221 and accompanying text
(discussing Klauer).
180

26 U.S.C.A § 7701(o) (West 2011); accord Health Care and Education Affordability
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067 (amending 26
U.S.C. § 7701(o)).
181
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1. Codification of the “Economic Substance Doctrine”
The economic substance doctrine is intended to ensure that the tax
consequences of a transaction are a result of the substance of the transaction
rather than the form of the transaction.182 “In general, this doctrine denies tax
benefits arising from transactions that do not result in a meaningful change to
the taxpayer’s economic position other than a purported reduction in Federal
income tax.”183 A related doctrine, the “business purpose doctrine” “involves an
inquiry into the subjective motives of the taxpayer—that is, whether the taxpayer
intended the transaction to serve some useful non-tax purpose.”184
The sham transaction doctrine185 has been a part of the federal common law
since the United States Supreme Court decision of Gregory v. Helvering.186 Since
then, the doctrine has been applied by many courts in many different ways.187
In an effort to “clarify and enhance application of the doctrine” 188 Congress
recently amended § 7701 of the Code by adding a new subsection.189 In addition,
Congress increased penalties for transactions found to violate the newly defined
economic substance doctrine (or any other similar common law doctrine190 ) by
amending §§ 6662 and 6664 of the Code.191
To date, the doctrine has not been applied to transactions involving
conservation easements in any reported case. However, there is no reason why the
doctrine would not apply to certain types of conservation transactions. A brief
summary of the provisions of the new federal law and some consideration of how
the law might apply to conservation transactions in the future follows.

182

King Enters., Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 517 (Ct. Cl. 1969).

Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCX-18-10, Technical Explanation of the Revenue
Provisions of the “Reconciliation Act of 2010,” as Amended, in Combination with the
“Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” 142 (2010) [hereinafter JCT Report].
183

184

Id. at 143.

See supra notes 177–81 and accompanying text (noting, for the purposes of this article,
“sham transaction” serves as shorthand for related doctrines, including the economic substance
doctrine and the step transaction doctrine).
185

186
293 U.S. 465, 470 (1935) (finding that a corporate reorganization had no purpose other
than tax avoidance since “[t]he whole undertaking, though conducted according to the terms
of subdivision (B), was in fact an elaborate and devious form of conveyance masquerading as a
corporate reorganization”).
187

JCT Report, supra note 183, at 143–44.

188

Id. at 152.

Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
§ 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1067 (amending 26 U.S.C. § 7701(o)).
189

190

Id. § 1409(b); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6662(b)(6) (West 2011).

191

Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010 § 1409(b)–(d).
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New subsection (o) of § 7701 of the Code provides,
(1) APPLICATION OF DOCTRINE—In the case of any
transaction to which the economic substance doctrine is relevant,
such transaction shall be treated as having economic substance
only if—
(A) the transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart
from Federal income tax effects) the taxpayer’s economic
position, and
(B) the taxpayer has a substantial purpose (apart from Federal
income tax effects) for entering into such transaction.192
In adopting this definition, Congress attempted to incorporate both the common
law principles of the economic substance doctrine (considered an objective
test 193) in subparagraph (A) and the principles of the “business purpose test”
(considered a subjective test 194) in subparagraph (B). Many commentators have
already pointed out that the lack of a statutory definition for “meaningful” or
“substantial” renders the new section as ambiguous and uncertain as the plethora
of common law principles and applications it is intended to clarify.195 The new
section exempts personal transactions of individuals from its application, provided
the transaction is not in connection with (1) a trade or business or (2) an activity
engaged in for income production.196 Yet, this exemption does not mean that
personal transactions of individuals are no longer subject to the common law
rules governing sham transactions. Those rules, by their various appellations,
remain applicable to such personal transactions. In fact, according to the Joint
Committee on Taxation, the codification of the economic substance doctrine is
“additive” to existing common law, not a replacement for the common law.197 The

192

26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(1).

193

JCT Report, supra note 183, at 143.

194

Id.

See, e.g., Thomas E. Taylor, Codification of the Economic Substance Doctrine by the Health
Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, McGuireWoods, 8 (Apr. 9, 2010),
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/publications/taxation/Economic%20Substance
%20Codification.pdf.
195

196

26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(5)(B).

197

JCT Report, supra note 183, at 155. The report states,
No inference is intended as to the proper application of the economic substance
doctrine under present law. The provision is not intended to alter or supplant any
other rule of law, including any common-law doctrine or provision of the Code or
regulations or other guidance thereunder; and it is intended the provision be construed
as being additive to any such other rule of law.

Id.
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logical inference from this is that all of the existing common law remains in place
and the new codification becomes an additional basis upon which transactions
may be challenged for lack of substance other than tax avoidance.198
The new law, as well as the pre-existing common law, will apply to conservation
transactions engaged in by corporations, limited liability companies, and
partnerships, all of which are increasingly engaging in conservation transactions,
often because of ownership structures created to hold family farms and ranches.199

2. Klauer v. Commissioner
Klauer v. Commissioner is the first reported case in which the government
challenged a conservation transaction using the “step transaction doctrine.” 200
The step transaction doctrine is another means of evaluating potential sham
transactions.201 Under the step transaction doctrine, “[s]teps that are transitory,
meaningless, or lacking in a nontax, business purpose may be disregarded for
purposes of determining the true nature of a transaction.” 202
The step transaction doctrine is closely related to the “economic substance
doctrine” but has been differentiated from that doctrine.203 Codification of the
economic substance doctrine “is not intended to alter or supplant any other
rule of law, including any common-law doctrine or provision of the Code or
Regulations or other guidance thereunder” and is merely “additive.”204 Therefore,

See id. (calling new § 7701(o) “additive”). It is hard to understand how adding a new set of
rules to the already numerous rules and concepts dealing with sham transactions can be considered
a “clarification” as the Committee Report asserts.
198

Placing illiquid assets, such as land, in family limited partnerships, limited liability
companies, and S corporations is a technique widely used to facilitate tax-free transfers using the
annual gift tax exemption.
199

200

T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-065, 385 (2010).

201

Id. at 386.

202

Id.

203

Wood, supra note 177, at 1. Wood states,
While these three concepts are often confused, I think one of them (at least) can
be segregated and is truly a horse of a different color. The step transaction doctrine is
procedural in nature, something that does not seek to examine whether a transaction
makes sense, as the economic substance doctrine does (more about that later).
Rather, the step transaction doctrine seeks to determine—regardless of the purpose
of the overall series of items—whether ostensibly separate transactions ought to be
integrated or stepped together, thus disregarding the overall form of the transaction
for its quintessential result.
The step transaction doctrine, to a far greater extent than the economic substance
doctrine and the sham transaction doctrine, is capable of close definition.

Id.
204

JCT Report, supra note 183, at 155.
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it is presumed that the step transaction doctrine (which is not mentioned at all in
the Joint Committee on Taxation Report) continues to apply both to businesses
and individuals. In addition, the other common law tools for challenging sham
transactions and the recent codification of the economic substance doctrine will
also apply.
Although the government lost, Klauer underscores the importance of ensuring
conservation transactions generating tax benefits have substance other than mere
tax avoidance. Klauer did not involve a conservation easement; however, the
issues raised in the case are directly applicable to many conservation easement
transactions. In Klauer, an S corporation, Klauer Manufacturing (Klauer),
entered into three options to bargain sell approximately 2581 acres (Property)
located in Taos County, New Mexico, to The Trust for Public Land (TPL) for a
price of $14.5 million.205 At the time Klauer estimated the value of the land to be
between $20 million and $21 million.206 TPL anticipated receiving funds from
the United States Land and Water Conservation Fund (Fund) for the purchase.207
However, because appropriations to the Fund were limited annually, TPL could
not raise sufficient amounts to purchase all of the Property in one transaction.208
Furthermore, TPL could not be sure of obtaining funds in the future.209
Because of the uncertainty over obtaining funds to pay the entire $14.5 million
purchase price, TPL structured the transaction as three options, with each option
covering a portion of the Property and exercisable solely in TPL’s discretion.210
Due to funding and appraisal issues, the three options were modified by TPL and
Klauer into six options, and the total purchase price was increased to $15 million.
TPL successfully raised the necessary $15 million, and all of the options were
exercised by the end of 2003.211 Klauer claimed charitable deductions in 2001,
2002, and 2003 totaling approximately $5.8 million.212
The government argued that the series of sales constituted “steps” of a
transaction, the sole purpose of which was tax avoidance.213 The government
asserted that these steps should be “collapsed” so that the entire series of sales

205
Klauer, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-065 at 370–71. See also Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v.
Commissioner, 136 T.C. 1 (2011), for an even more recent (and failed) attempt by the IRS to apply
the step transaction doctrine, in this case to the allocation of historic rehabilitation credits.
206

Klauer, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-065 at 372.

207

Id.

208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Id. at 372–75.

211

Id. at 375–83.

212

Id. at 383–84.

213

Id. at 385.
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would be treated as one sale for $15 million in 2001. The court noted that
the parties had agreed that if the steps were collapsed, there would be no
deduction.214 The government sought an additional $1,336,629 in taxes from
Klauer’s shareholders.215
The court examined three alternative tests for application of the doctrine:
The step transaction doctrine is in effect another
rule of substance over form; it treats a series of formally
separate “steps” as a single transaction if such steps are
in substance integrated, interdependent, and focused
toward a particular result. . . . There is no universally
accepted test as to when and how the step transaction doctrine should be applied to a given set of facts.
Courts have applied three alternative tests in deciding
whether to invoke the step transaction doctrine in a
particular situation.
The narrowest alternative is the “binding commitment” test, under which a series of transactions are
collapsed if, at the time the first step is entered into,
there was a binding commitment to undertake the
later step.
....
. . . That test “requires telescoping several steps into one trans
action only if a binding commitment existed as to the second
step at the time the first step was taken.”216

Id. at 385 n.38 (“The parties agree that if the Court were to find that the step transaction
doctrine applies, petitioners would not be entitled to the charitable contribution deductions at issue
and that if the Court were to find that the step transaction doctrine does not apply, petitioners
would be entitled to those deductions.”). This seemingly strange agreement resulted in a waiver
of Klauer’s right to claim a bargain sale deduction for the transaction, even if it were collapsed.
Presuming that Klauer’s appraisal supported the fact that the $15 million sale price was below the
fair market value of the Property (and the appraisals used by TPL to support the purchase showed
that the value of the Property was approximately $20.45 million) even if the six different sales were
collapsed into one sale, there would still have been a charitable contribution of $5.45 million. The
sole consequence of “collapsing” the steps in the transaction should have been that the charitable
deduction for the bargain sale would be limited to the year 2001 (plus the five-year carry-forward
for unused charitable deductions).
214

215

Id. at 370.

Id. at 386–87 (citations omitted) (quoting Penrod v. Comm’r, 88 T.C. 1415, 1428–30
(1987) and Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1245 (5th Cir. 1983)).
216
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The court found that the “binding commitment” test did not apply because
there were no guarantees TPL would receive the funding necessary to exercise the
options and TPL had no obligation to exercise any or all of the options.217
At the other extreme, the most far-reaching
alternative is the “end result” test. Under this test, the
step transaction doctrine will be invoked if it appears
that a series of formally separate steps are really
prearranged parts of a single transaction intended from
the outset to reach the ultimate result.
....
. . . Under that test, “purportedly separate transactions are to
be amalgamated when the successive steps were designed and
executed as part of a plan to achieve an intended result.”218
The court found the “end result” test did not apply because
the Trust’s exercise of each of various options that it had under
the Option Agreement as amended and its purchase of each
of specified portions of the Taos Overlook pursuant to the
exercise of each of those options were not component parts of
a single transaction that Klauer Manufacturing intended and
prearranged from the outset be taken in order to sell to the Trust
the approximately 2,581 acres of the Taos Overlook.219
The court next turned to the third test:
The third test is the “interdependence” test, which
focuses on whether “the steps are so interdependent
that the legal relations created by one transaction would
have been fruitless without a completion of the series.”
....
. . . That test focuses on “whether the individual steps in a series
had independent significance or whether they had meaning only
as part of the larger transaction. This test concentrates on the
relationship between the steps, rather than on their “end result.”220
217

Id. at 387–88.

Id. at 386, 388 (citations omitted) (quoting Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1429, and Sec. Indus. Ins.
Co., 702 F.2d at 1246).
218

219

Id. at 391.

Id. at 386, 391–92 (citations omitted) (quoting Penrod, 88 T.C. at 1430, and Sec. Indus.
Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1246).
220
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The court rejected application of this test as well, finding that each of the options
in the transaction had independent meaning and that TPL’s purchase of a portion
of the property under any single option would not have been “fruitless.” 221
The facts of Klauer so overwhelmingly support the court’s conclusions that it
is hard, at least based on the facts recited in the opinion, to understand why the
government challenged the transaction in the first place.

3. Examples and Discussion
Neither the economic substance doctrine nor the step transaction doctrine is
likely to apply to most conservation transactions. In many complex transactions,
particularly those where there is an attempt to syndicate a conservation easement
deduction, other issues are likely to arise defeating the transaction without
resorting to these doctrines.222 However, one type of transaction, intended to
qualify for the 100% write-off available under revived 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)
(E)(v)(I), provides an illustration of how the newly codified economic substance
doctrine might be applied.
Example 1:
Suppose Jones Inc., a family-owned C corporation, has been approached by
the XYZ Land Trust which wants to bargain purchase a conservation easement
over the Jones Inc. ranch for 50% of the value of the easement. Jones Inc.’s income
is entirely from the “business of farming” so the tax deduction available to Jones
Inc. for the contribution portion of the bargain sale may be taken against 100% of
Jones Inc.’s income.223 However, income from the sale of a conservation easement
is not considered income “from the business of farming.”224 Therefore, the bargain
sale will disqualify Jones Inc. from enjoying the 100% write-off. To avoid this
consequence, Jones Inc. and XYZ (which has all of the funding necessary for the
purchase) agree to structure the sale as an installment sale. The conveyance of the
easement is to be made at closing in exchange for a payment equal to an amount
just under Jones Inc.’s anticipated income for that year. In addition, Jones Inc.
will receive, at closing, a note from XYZ providing for the payment of the balance
of the purchase price over the next five years.

221

Id. at 393.

See Lindstrom, supra note 176, at 115–28 (discussing donative intent and its application
to various types of conservation transactions).
222

223

26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(2)(B) (2006); see supra Part II.B.

26 U.S.C. § 2032A(e)(5) (defining farming to include cultivating the soil, raising or har
vesting agricultural products, and handling such products).
224
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Let us examine this transaction from the perspective of the government under
the new statutory definition of “economic substance.” 225 First, does the transaction
change in a meaningful way the taxpayer’s economic position (apart from federal
income tax effects)? The government could argue that at the beginning of the
transaction Jones Inc. had an offer to purchase a conservation easement for a
stated bargain sale price and afterwards it received that price. The only effect of
the installment sale was to qualify Jones Inc. for the 100% write-off. There was
no reason why the entire purchase price could not have been paid at closing. The
only effect of the transaction was to change the income tax effects of the sale. As
a result, the government could argue (1) that there was no economic substance to
the transaction; (2) that Jones Inc. should be treated as having received the entire
purchase price at closing; (3) that Jones Inc. should be required to report gain on
that basis; and (4) that Jones Inc. also be prevented from writing off the charitable
contribution portion of the bargain sale against 100% of its income.226
Second, did Jones Inc. have a substantial purpose (apart from federal income
tax effects) for entering into such transaction? Here again, the government
would seem to have a strong argument that the only possible motivation for the
installment structure was tax avoidance—ensuring that more than 50% of Jones
Inc.’s income came from the “business of farming” so that it could qualify for the
100% write-off.227
Jones Inc.’s best response is that the Code expressly sanctions installment sales
so long as there is some risk future installments will not be paid.228 In the first
United States Supreme Court decision to deal with sham transactions, the Court
stated that a motivation to avoid tax is not fatal to a transaction so long as the
transaction is not outside the boundaries of the intent of the Code.229 In other

26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (West 2011); accord Health Care and Education Affordability
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, § 1409(a), 124 Stat. 1029, 1068 (amending 26
U.S.C. § 7701(o)).
225

226
See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o) (defining economic substance). The consequence would be
to limit the write-off to 10% of Jones Inc.’s taxable income as it is a C corporation. 26 U.S.C.
§ 170(b)(2)(A).
227
See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(v)(I) (allowing the 100% write-off for qualified farmers
and ranchers).
228
Id. § 453. The requirement of risk is met by the seller’s acceptance of a promissory note,
even if the note is secured. However, escrowing funds to cover future payments would lack the
element of risk and disqualify the sale for installment treatment.
229

Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). The Court stated,
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise would be his
taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law permits, cannot be doubted.
But the question for determination is whether what was done, apart from the tax
motive, was the thing which the statute intended.

Id. (citations omitted).
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words, Jones Inc. may rely on provisions of the Code to avoid tax, provided that
the provision relied on was intended to allow installment sales to defer income. In
this hypothetical, the income deferral was expressly for the purpose of qualifying
Jones Inc. for the 100% write-off.
However, the intent behind the installment sales provision was to provide a
method of accounting that allows a taxpayer to defer realization of gain, where
a sale was made in installments, to give the taxpayer sufficient liquidity to pay
taxes when due.230 In this hypothetical, Jones Inc. is not confronted with a sale
that can only be made in installments because XYZ has all the funds necessary to
complete the purchase in hand. Therefore, Jones Inc. does not need to rely on the
installment sales provisions in order to match its tax liability with income from
the sale. Instead, Jones Inc. is deliberately seeking installment sales treatment to
qualify for other tax benefits.231
The result of the installment structure in this example would be quite different
if XYZ did not have the funds in hand to pay the entire purchase price up front.
In that hypothetical, the facts would be more like those of Klauer.
Example 2:
Another situation in which the government might attempt to apply the
step transaction doctrine or the economic substance doctrine is that in which a
landowner “phases” a series of conservation easement contributions over time.232
Assume the year is 2012 and Congress has not renewed the fifteen-year carryforward provisions which currently expire at the end of 2011.233 Rancher Will
wants to contribute a conservation easement on his 500-acre ranch. The proposed

Fred C. Chandler, The Installment Sales Provisions of Internal Revenue Code Section 453,
7 Rutgers-Camden L.J. 428, 428 (1976).
230

231
See supra notes 223–30 and accompanying text. The arguments supporting Jones Inc.
could be further extrapolated and might even become convincing; however, it is beyond the scope
of this article.

Phasing conservation easements was particularly useful when the carry-forward period for
unused deductions was limited to five years. The strategy was this: when the value of a conservation
easement over an entire tract of land would generate a deduction greater than the landowner
could use within the statutory period, the landowner would only place a conservation easement
on so much of the land as would generate a deduction that could be completely used within the
statutory period.
232

See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-312, § 723, 124 Stat. 3296, 3316 (extending the expiration of applicable
provisions to December 31, 2011). After 2011, the carry-forward period would presumably revert
to five years. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (establishing a five-year carry-forward generally),
with 26 U.S.C.A. § 170(b)(1)(E) (West 2011) (establishing a fifteen-year carry-forward, which will
expire on December 31, 2011).
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easement is appraised at a value of $3 million, generating a federal income tax
deduction of an equal amount. However, Will’s annual income will only allow
him to use $1 million of the deduction within the six years allowed by the law.234
Will decides to grant the easement over only 167 acres of the ranch, which will
generate a deduction of about $1 million.235 By 2017, Will has used up all of
his deduction for this easement and grants a second easement over 166 acres of
the ranch, which again generates a deduction of about $1 million. Will’s income
increases after 2017 and he writes the deduction for the second easement off
by 2020, at which time he grants an easement over the remainder of the ranch,
generating a deduction of around $1.2 million.
In 2021, the IRS sends a deficiency notice to Will notifying him that he owes
$700,000 in additional income tax because it is disallowing the deductions for
the contributions made in 2017 and 2020. Using the step transaction doctrine,
the government argues that (1) the three easements constitute three steps in a
transaction whose only purpose was tax avoidance; (2) these steps should be
collapsed into one step; and (3) Will should be treated as having contributed only
one conservation easement over the entire 500 acres in 2012.236
Let us examine the government’s challenge using the three tests found in
Klauer. First, the “binding commitment” test.237 As noted, this test “requires
telescoping several steps into one transaction only if a binding commitment
existed as to the second step at the time the first step was taken.”238 Clearly, there
was no obligation for Will to contribute any of these conservation easements, let
alone all of them. Therefore, the binding commitment test does not apply.

See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(B) (providing for a five-year expiration). Again, remember that
this assumes that the fifteen-year carry-forward period has expired. See sources cited supra note 233.
234

235
See 26 U.S.C. § 170(b)(1)(E)(v)(I) (limiting the deduction to 100% of income). Actually
slightly less because the easement will increase the value of the remaining unprotected portion of the
ranch reducing the value of the easement on the 167 acres by an equivalent amount.

The newly codified “economic substance doctrine” cannot be applied in this case because
Will is an individual and the transaction was not one for the purpose of generating income. See
26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(5)(B) (limiting the applicability of the economic substance doctrine to
individuals engaged in an activity for the production of income). Note also by making its challenge
in 2021, the IRS has preserved its claim against the easement contributed in 2017 as well as that
contributed in 2020 because the three-year statute of limitations did not cease to run on the 2017
contribution until the last deduction from that contribution was claimed in 2019. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 6501(a) (requiring the IRS to assess tax within three years after the tax return is filed); 26 C.F.R.
§ 301.6501(a)-1 (2011) (barring the IRS from initiating a judicial proceeding after three years after
the date of filing).
236
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Klauer v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-065, 386–87 (2010).
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Id. at 386 (quoting Sec. Indus. Ins. Co. v. United States, 702 F.2d 1234, 1245 (5th Cir. 1983)).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol11/iss2/6

46

Lindstrom: Recent Developments in the Law Affecting Conservation Easements:

2011

Conservation Easements

479

Second, the “end result” test.239 As noted, under this test “purportedly separate
transactions are to be amalgamated when the successive steps were designed
and executed as part of a plan to achieve an intended result.” 240 The quote begs
the question: what kind of intended result? Clearly, every transaction has some
intended result. It must be assumed that if the intended result was entirely, or
almost entirely, to avoid taxes, the transaction violates this test. This test requires
us to look at Will’s motivation in granting three easements rather than just one.
“The taxpayer’s subjective intent is especially relevant . . . because it allows us to
determine whether the taxpayer directed a series of transactions to an intended
purpose.” 241 Obviously a significant part of contributing three easements rather
than one was to maximize enjoyment of the charitable deduction associated with
protecting the ranch, which is another way of saying “tax avoidance.”
However, proving, and even understanding, motivation is extremely difficult.
It would seem logical that unless there is no valid explanation other than tax
avoidance for why Will structured the protection of the ranch, and particularly
because a tax motivation is not by itself fatal, the protection of the ranch by
three contributions rather than one should pass the end result test. At least one
meaningful non-tax motivation for protecting the ranch in phases is the desire by
the landowner to retain flexibility regarding future use of the ranch in the face of
economic uncertainty.
This leads us to the third step transaction test, the “interdependence test.” 242
This test looks at “whether the individual steps in a series had independent
significance or whether they had meaning only as part of the larger transaction.” 243
The protection of Will’s ranch would appear to easily pass this test. This is because
each contribution resulted in the meaningful protection of a portion of the ranch
independently of whether additional protection occurred. In this regard, the
result is much the same as in Klauer where the court found that failure by TPL to
exercise any one option did not render “fruitless” those options it had exercised.244
In other words, each of the series of steps leading to the complete protection of
Will’s ranch were independent of the others, not “interdependent.”
While the newly codified economic substance doctrine should not apply to
Will because he fits the exception to the law, had he owned his ranch in a corporate
form or as a limited liability company, the law could have been applied.245
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Id. at 386, 388–90.
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Id. at 388 (quoting Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1246).
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Id. (quoting True v. United States, 190 F.3d 1165, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999)).
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Id. at 391.
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Id. (quoting Sec. Indus. Ins. Co., 702 F.2d at 1246–47).
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Id. at 393.
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See supra note 196 and accompanying text (regarding this exception).
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Therefore, an evaluation of the phased protection of Will’s ranch under this new
law is appropriate.
As noted earlier, the new law requires two inquiries.246 First, whether pro
tecting the ranch by three contributions rather than one changes in a meaningful
way (apart from federal tax effects) Will’s economic position. Because the three
contributions preserved significant economic flexibility and value for Will over a
number of years, the answer to this question is yes.
The second question is whether Will had a substantial purpose (other than
tax avoidance) for structuring the transaction as he did. The analysis required to
answer this question is very much like the analysis required to answer the “end
result” test found in the step transaction doctrine. Arguably, so long as Will had
a meaningful purpose for protecting the ranch in three phases other than tax
avoidance, his purpose satisfies this test. As noted earlier, at least one meaningful
non-tax purpose for Will’s approach would be his desire to retain as much
economic flexibility over time as possible while still ultimately protecting the
ranch. Therefore, the likely answer to the second question posed by the codified
economic substance test is also affirmative.
Example 3:
Finally, let us examine a relatively complex structure which has the effect of
syndicating a conservation easement deduction. Suppose a development company
has just completed a major “conservation development” in which ten residential
lots are surrounded by 500 acres of open space. The company wants to be able to
assure lot purchasers that the open space is permanently protected. It also wants
to provide a tax incentive to interested lot buyers. It conveys the open space land
to Open Land, LLC (Open Land) of which the development company is the
sole member.
Open Land then enters into an option agreement with ABC Land Trust
(ABC) in which Open Land agrees to bargain sell a conservation easement over
the 500 acres for $5000. The option period does not begin until two years after
the date upon which the option was exercised. During the two years before the
option can be exercised, Open Land successfully sells all ten lots and also sells ten
memberships in Open Land (representing the entire ownership of Open Land) to
the lot purchasers for $10,000 each. At the end of this period ABC exercises the
option and purchases the easement, paying the $5000 purchase price. Open Land

246

26 U.S.C.A. § 7701(o)(1) (West 2011).
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obtains a qualified independent appraisal of the value of the easement, which
shows that the value of the easement is $500,000. Each of Open Land’s members
claims their pro-rata share of the $495,000 deduction.247
The IRS several years later sends deficiency notices to all of Open Land’s
members disallowing their charitable deduction for Open Land’s bargain sale
of the conservation easement to ABC. It claims the transaction generating the
conveyance of the easement violated the requirements of the newly codified
“economic substance doctrine.” 248
First it is necessary to figure out exactly what aspect of the transaction is subject
to challenge. This is best done by comparing the transaction that actually took
place with an alternative transaction that could have taken place and eliminating
the various steps of the transaction that were, arguably, not needed to achieve the
end result.
Here the actual transaction involved the following steps: (1) conveyance of
open space land by developer to wholly-owned Open Land; (2) grant of enforceable
pledge by Open Land to land trust; (3) pledge conditioned on not being called for
at least two years; (4) sale of memberships in Open Land to lot purchasers; (5) call
of pledge by land trust; and (6) deduction claimed by members of Open Land.
An alternative approach with the same end result (i.e., bargain sale of a
conservation easement on the 500 acres) would have been one in which the
developer itself bargain sold the conservation easement to ABC, then conveyed
the land to Open Land subject to the easement, and sold memberships in Open
Land to the lot buyers. The result is the same as in the actual transaction: the
500 acres are protected and the lot buyers end up owning the 500 acres through
memberships in Open Land.
Comparing these two approaches, the first question is: whether the actual
transaction changes in a meaningful way (apart from federal tax effects) Open
Land’s members’ (the relevant taxpayers in this situation) economic position over
what would have resulted from the theoretical transaction. Under either alternative
the members ended up with a one-tenth membership in Open Land; under either
alternative Open Land ended up owning the 500 acres subject to a conservation
easement. However, under the actual transaction the $5000 purchase price flowed

Note, for this to work the 500 acres must have been legally, physically, and financially
developable. Lindstrom, supra note 176, at 19–20. It could not have been required open space
under any governmental approval of the development, or the bargain sale of the easement would
have been a quid pro quo transaction in which the necessary donative intent to claim a charitable
deduction was lacking. Id.
247
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See 26 U.S.C.A § 7701(o)(1) (codifying the economic substance doctrine).
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through to the members of Open Land whereas in the theoretical transaction
the purchase price of the easement went to the developer. Is this a “meaningful”
change? Suppose that the bargain price of the easement had been $250,000 rather
than merely $5000? We begin to see the problem with the undefined terms in the
new law.
Again, using the comparison of the actual transaction with the theoretical
transaction the second question required under the 2010 Tax Act is whether the
members of Open Land had a substantial purpose (other than tax avoidance) for
structuring the transaction as it was.249 Of course, the first problem in answering
this question is that, presumably, the members of Open Land, the lot buyers, had
no hand in structuring the transaction. They merely wanted to purchase lots in
the development and the structure was dictated by the developer. If the developer’s
motivation is examined, it certainly was not tax avoidance, at least for itself. It was
marketing residential lots in a manner that included a tax incentive to purchasers.
However, overall we can analyze whether the transaction was structured with
a substantial purpose other than tax avoidance. Clearly the developer intended
to provide tax benefits to lot purchasers. While the tax benefits were not for the
developer’s benefit, the purpose was still tax avoidance. Also, the developer, as a
developer, might have had a difficult time claiming the tax benefits for itself.250
By transferring the tax benefits that the developer could not enjoy to the lot
purchasers who could, the developer was making possible tax deductions that
could not otherwise have been used. It is difficult to impute these motivations
to the lot buyers, unless they were given a choice to purchase under the actual
transaction or the theoretical transaction. The lot buyers had no choice regarding
the structure of the transactions. Therefore, it is hard to argue that they, as the
taxpayers whose deductions were challenged, had any motivation other than
purchasing lots in this particular development. Such a motivation would not
appear to violate the economic substance doctrine.
The government might have an easier time challenging this transaction under
the step transaction doctrine than under the 2010 Tax Act, for reasons I will leave
to the reader to analyze. However, the increased penalties provided by the new law
would not be available in that case.

IV. Conclusion
The tax rewards of the contribution or bargain sale of a conservation easement
have never been greater. However, the risks involved in permanently protecting
one’s land in the expectation of receiving these benefits have also never been
249

Id. § 7701(o)(1)(b).

See Lindstrom, supra note 176, at 129–33 (discussing issues faced by developers claiming
charitable contributions for conservation easements related to development projects).
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greater. After years of neglect, the IRS is bearing down on conservation easements
and conservation transactions. As the cases discussed in this article demonstrate,
the focus has become minute, making it even more imperative that one “read the
Regulations, read the Regulations, and read the Regulations.” 251
Traditionally the focus of the IRS has been on the valuation of conservation
easements, and that still remains true today.252 However, the IRS has increasingly
been successful in challenging easement deductions for technical failures to comply
with the Code and Regulations. When the government wins this latter type of
case, the consequence is the loss of the entire deduction, not just a reduction.
Conservation easement law has become highly specialized. Except for sham
transaction issues, the rules are pretty clear—there are just a lot of them. No one
should be deterred from contributing a conservation easement and claiming a
reasonable deduction for that contribution, so long as the transaction is guided
from beginning to end (including review of the appraisal and the filing of the Form
8283) by knowledgeable tax counsel. The days when a land trust and a landowner
could expect to sit down on their own, negotiate a conservation easement, draft it,
sign it, and be done with it, are definitely over.

See supra notes 46–248 and accompanying text. As my friend Stephen J. Small, one
of the authors of the original conservation easement regulations, likes to say, “And comply with
the Regulations.”
251
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Since 1985 there have been approximately thirty reported cases in which the issue was
the valuation of a conservation easement. This excludes cases in which a deduction was entirely
disallowed for technical reasons. Of those cases, five were ones in which the taxpayer was able to
salvage 100% of the original deduction. The closest to a zero valuation was a case in which the
taxpayer could only salvage 0.8% of the original deduction. The average amount of the original
deduction retained by taxpayers in all thirty cases was 62.04% and the median was 62.1%. See
McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 102 (1991), aff ’d, 994 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Richmond
v. United States, 699 F. Supp. 578 (E.D. La.1988); Todd v. United States, 617 F. Supp. 253 (W.D.
Pa. 1985); Trout Ranch v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2010-283 (2010); Hughes v. Comm’r, T.C.M.
(RIA) 2009-094 (2009); Kiva Dunes Conservation v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-145 (2009);
Simmons v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2009-208 (2009); Whitehouse Hotel v. Comm’r, 131 T.C.
112 (2008); Strasburg v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 2000-094, 513–14 (2000) (pertaining to the
original easement); id. (pertaining to the amendment); Browning v. Comm’r, 109 T.C. 303 (1997);
Johnston v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 1997-475 (1997); Schwab v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 1994-232
(1994); Clemens v. Comm’r, T.C.M. (RIA) 1992-436 (1992); Forte v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M. (CCH)
1754 (1991); Schapiro v. Comm’r, 61 T.C.M (CCH) 2215 (1991) (Easement #1); id. (Easement
#2); Higgins v. Comm’r, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1536 (1990); Dorsey v. Comm’r, 59 T.C.M. (CCH)
592 (1990); Fannon v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1587 (1989); Griffin v. Comm’r, 56 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1560 (1989), aff ’d, 911 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1990); Nicoladis v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH)
624 (1988); Losch v. Comm’r, 55 T.C.M. (CCH) 909 (1988); Stotler v. Comm’r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH)
973 (1987); Stanley Works & Subsidiaries v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 389 (1986); Fannon v. Comm’r,
52 T.C.M. (CCH) 1113 (1986), modified in unpublished opinion, 842 F.2d 1290 (4th Cir. 1988);
Symington v. Comm’r, 87 T.C. 892 (1986); Hilborn v. Comm’r, 85 T.C. 677 (1985); Akers v.
Comm’r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1113 (1984), aff ’d, 799 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1086 (1987); Thayer v. Comm’r, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1504 (1977).
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